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Why Doesn't She Leave? 
The Collision of First Amendment 
Rights and Effective Court Remedies 
for Victims of Domestic Violence 
by LAURIE S. KOHN" 
Why doesn't she leave? This is a commonly asked question by 
people confounded by the phenomenon of women who stay in 
battering relationships despite the abuse they endure.! Psychologists 
and victims,2 advocates also grapple with this question because the 
* Visiting Associate Professor and Assistant Director, Domestic Violence Clinic, 
Georgetown University Law Center. LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., Harvard College. I am grateful to Deborah 
Epstein and Linda Hirshman for their extremely thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of 
this Article. I want to thank Chris Murphy for his boundless support and assistance with 
every phase of this process. I am also indebted to the large group of friends, family, and 
colleagues who debated and discussed this topic with me over the past year. Finally, this 
project could not have been completed without the unflagging research assistance of 
Monique Sherman, Jennifer Gray, and Heidi Hertel. 
1. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . .. Still: Unfulfilled Promises of 
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1149,1169 (1995) 
(referring to the frequent inquiries into why women stay in battering relationships); Joan 
S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives 
on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1317 (1993) 
(alluding to the omnipresence of the "why didn't she leave" inquiry); Martha R. Mahoney, 
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
5 (1991) (asserting that the question shapes social and legal analysis of battering); Steve 
Kemper, When to Leave, HART. COURANT, June 21, 1998, at 7 (presenting an interview of 
an expert on domestic violence in which the third question focused on why battered 
women do not leave); Susan Reinhardt, Domestic Violence; It Began with Control, Ended 
with Battering/Unusual Event Tells of Shattered Lives, ASHEVILLE CIT. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
1997, at Cl (raising the question of why women do not leave abusive relationships). 
2. Throughout this Article, I will interchangeably use victim and survivor to refer to 
individuals who endure violence in their intimate relationships. During my work with this 
population, I have found little consensus about which term most accurately and 
appropriately describes their status. Primarily, it is important to note that these 
individuals are three-dimensional figures whose identities are not monolithically dictated 
by the nature of their relationships. It is for the ease of the reader that I reduce the phases 
[l] 
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paradox often casts doubt on the credibility of victims and the 
efficacy of legal and social science responses. 
Despite the persistence of the question, social science literature 
is replete with reasons why a victim does not or cannot leave a 
battering relationship.3 Commonly cited explanations include lack of 
financial resources;4 fear of physical retribution;5 lack of access to 
information about options for escape;6 enduring love for the batterer 
and belief he will change;7 learned helplessness;8 and depression.9 
This Article, however, focuses on a pervasive and previously 
unexamined reason: the victim's fear that the batterer will publicize 
truthful confidential information that will hurt her. lO If the victim 
"individual who has been battered" or "individual who has survived violence by an 
intimate partner" to victim and survivor. 
3. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that much scholarship has been generated to 
address the central question of why she does not leave). See, e.g., Truss, supra note 1 
(examining the dynamics of power and control that trap women in battering 
relationships ). 
4. Maria L. Imperial, Self Sufficiency and Safety: Welfare Reform for Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 3, 3 (1997) (stating that many 
victims of domestic violence are financially dependant on their batterers whose abuse 
undermines their efforts to keep their jobs); Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic 
Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, 
and Voice, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1995) (citing the financial pressures on 
both high income and low income women who consider leaving battering relationships). 
5. Working Group, Charging Battered Women with "Failure to Protect": Still 
Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 858-59 (2000) ("If she takes [the 
batterer's] threats seriously, and statistics show she should, then she may conclude it is 
safer for her and her children in the short term to stay in the relationship."). See generally 
Joyce Klemperer, Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence against Women by Intimate 
Partners: Critical Issues: Programs for Battered Women - What Works?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 
1171,1178 (1995) (citing the need for safety as the most critical issue for a woman fleeing 
an abusive relationship). 
6. Margulies, supra note 4, at 1077 (chronicling the significant barriers victims 
encounter in accessing social services and legal assistance when leaving a battering 
relationship). 
7. Even despite full access to resources for escape, some victims will simply stay in a 
battering relationship because they still love the abuser. A woman will be the hostage of 
her own ambivalence: loving the abuser, but hating the abuse. See generally Nan Seuffert, 
Domestic Violence, Disclosures of Romantic Love, and Complex Personhood in the Law, 
23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 211 (1999) (exploring the challenges this ambivalence creates 
in legal discourse). 
8. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (2d ed. 1980) 
(introducing the application of learned helplessness theory to victims of domestic violence 
to explain why they may stay in a battering relationship). 
9. Kelly Grace Monacella, Comment, Supporting a Defense of Duress: The 
Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 699, 704 (1997) (explaining 
that a battered woman's passivity can be attributable to depression). 
10. Throughout this Article, I will often refer to individuals who are battered as 
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were to seek the court's protection,ll most state courts have the 
authority to prohibit the batterer from divulging the information. 
Under state law, most judges can issue a domestic violence protection 
order that includes a restriction on the batterer's speech. But are 
these restrictions constitutional? 
This Article examines the potential constitutional barriers to the 
issuance of this relief. 
Part I will define the scope of the problem by examining case 
studies of three victims who typify the victims in need of such 
protection. They possess the characteristics that batterers most 
commonly threaten to reveal:12 HIV status; sexual orientation;13 and 
immigration status. 
Part II looks to the speech restriction itself against the backdrop 
females and the perpetrators as males. This label is only shorthand and is not intended to 
cast into doubt the existence of female on male battering. While men are victims of 
intimate violence and women the batterers, the statistics bear out that in the majority of 
cases, the reverse is true. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIME (2001) ("Intimate violence is primarily a crime against 
women - in 1998, females were the victims of 72 % of intimate murders and the victims of 
about 85% of nonlethal intimate violence."); OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T. 
OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 
(2000) (providing the statistic that 1.5 million women as compared with 834,732 men are 
raped and/or physically assaulted by intimate partners annually); Marta B. VereJa, 
Protection of Domestic Violence Victims under the New York Human Rights Law's 
Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 27 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 
1231, 1234 (2000) (stating that three quarters of all victims of domestic violence are 
women). This shorthand is not intended to denigrate the experiences of men who are 
beaten by their partners, nor call into question that such battering exists. Furthermore, 
gender short hand is not intended to deny the existence of same-sex battering. Same-sex 
battering exists and is often the context in which the dynamic of threats of revealing 
confidential information arises, as will be discussed later. 
11. Often victims who do seek the court's protection later withdraw their petitions for 
protection because of the on-set of such threats. 
12. I base this conclusion on my own experience of working with hundreds of victims 
of domestic violence in the District of Columbia over the past five years and the 
observations of those whom I have interviewed who work with victims on a daily basis in 
D.C. Superior Court. 
13. By arguing that speech "outing" an individual for being gay or HIV positive is 
harassment and should be enjoined, one risks perpetuating stereotypes that the allegation 
should be one associated with shame. However, I make no normative statement regarding 
the appropriate societal reaction to this information. Instead, my analysis is descriptive of 
common societal reactions to information relating to HIV and sexual orientation. I see 
the need for domestic violence speech injunctions based on HIV positive and/or gay, 
lesbian or bisexual victims' fears about this societal reaction. As one commentator stated, 
"[t]o deny the existence of prejudice because acknowledging it seems politically incorrect 
does a disservice to society." David H. Pollack, Comment, Forced Out of the Closet: Sexual 
Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing", 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 711, 733 (1992). 
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of First Amendment jurisprudence, analyzing what level of scrutiny a 
court would accord this type of restriction. Part III analyzes the First 
Amendment value of the speech in question, analogizing to 
jurisprudence regarding blackmail statutes. Part IV examines 
doctrines in which courts have considered First Amendment 
challenges to restrictions that protect state interests similar to those at 
issue in the domestic violence context. Those interests include 
privacy, child welfare, and protection from domestic violence. Next, 
Part V briefly refers to prior restraint caselaw to determine if this 
injunction would present an invalid prior restraint on speech. In Part 
VI, the Article presents the parameters of a domestic violence speech 
restriction that is most likely to survive constitutional· scrutiny. 
Finally, the Article concludes by arguing that although such 
injunctions might encounter significant legal challenges, they are 
normatively important and constitutionally sound relief. 
I. Scope of the Problem 
A. HIV status 
Joanne14 met Larry when she was 30 years old. After a year of 
peace and relative happiness, Joanne and her son, a chil<;l from a 
previous relationship, moved in with Larry. Not long thereafter, 
Joanne tested positive for HIV. Despite Joanne's frequent inquiries 
into Larry's health status and his representations that he annually 
tested negative for HIV, Joanne suspected that Larry had infected 
her. And then the violence began. Larry punched her repeatedly in 
the face when she upset him. Once he pinned her against a wall by 
her throat, strangling her until she passed out. 
Although Joanne knew she had to protect herself and her son 
from this violence, she felt isolated from the rest of the world. Aside 
from her doctors, Larry was the only person who knew that she was 
HIV positive. Joanne did not trust anyone else with this sensitive 
information because the potential effect of its pUblicity on her 
employment as a childcare provider would be devastating. Larry 
understood this. At first his threats were subtle, but soon, whenever 
14. All client narratives consist of various components of several client stories that I 
have encountered in my extensive practice in the District of Columbia Superior Court's 
Domestic Violence Unit. Amalgamating client attributes and assigning pseudonyms are 
intended to protect client privacy. For an enlightening discussion of the complexity of 
using client narratives, see Binny Miller, Give them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client 
Narrative in Case Theory, 3 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994). 
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he suspected Joanne was preparing to move out, he would tell her 
that if she did not stay, he would write a letter to her employer, she 
would lose her job, and she would never again work with children. 
Joanne would reconsider and stay with Larry, frightened that her 
employers might well react with panic to her health status despite the 
precautions that she took in protecting the children she cared for 
from transmission. Larry would also threaten to contact people at her 
son's school. Joanne feared that this would result in her son being 
ostracized by his peers and teachers. 
Joanne finally dared to leave when her son walked in the 
bedroom to see Larry holding a knife to her throat. The ten year-old 
called the police and the next day Joanne went to court to petition for 
protection. 
This harrowing example is by no means uncommon in abusive 
relationships. Literature examining same-sex battering routinely 
refers to the fear of HIV "outing" as being a primary cause of the 
secrecy that characterizes same-sex domestic violence.ls Victims often 
decide against seeking legal protection because they are concerned 
that their batterers, in return, will publicize this information to people 
who will take discriminatory actions against them. Victims might 
experience detrimental repercussions both professionally and socially 
due to fear of HIV transmission and/or homophobia.16 
B. Sexual orientation 
Jacques came to court to file for a protection order after his 
former partner, Mike, had kidnapped him, driven him to a secluded 
park off the highway, and attempted to slit his throat. Abuse had 
characterized their relationship for well over a year before it 
culminated in this kidnapping. Jacques was the only son of a large 
African immigrant family. The family was extremely close and with 
the exception of Jacques all of the adult children lived at home. 
Although Jacques had moved out a year before to live with Mike, his 
15. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere while 
Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 325, 337 (1999) 
(emphasizing that a bauerer's threats of "outing" often extend to HIV status); Joseph 
Hanania, Next L.A.: A Hidden World of Violence: The Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian 
Center Launches a Program to Publicize and Help Prevent Domestic Abuse, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 1996, at B2 (discussing that batterers may monopolize on societal biases by 
threatening to reveal the HIV status of fleeing partners to employers). 
16. Laurie S. Kohn, Infecting Attorney-Client Confidentiality: The Ethics of HIV 
Disclosure, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 561 n. 105 (1996) (reviewing the professional and 
social effects of fear of AIDS transmission). 
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family did not know he was gay. In their minds, Mike was their son's 
roommate. Because Jacques was their only son, his parents had 
pinned on him all of their hopes of generations of American children 
carrying on their family name. Knowing this, Jacques had determined 
never to inform his parents about his sexual orientation. 
This was the technique by which Mike coerced Jacques to remain 
involved with him despite the abuse. Mike had easy access to 
Jacques's family and could easily follow through with his frequent 
threats to "out" Jacques to his parents. Jacques thought that he could 
remain in a relationship with Mike long enough to deter him from 
following through with his threats. Ultimately, however, staying 
became too dangerous. 
Fearing homophobic responses, gay men and women often hide 
their sexual orientation from employers and family members.17 This 
fear gives batterers a manipulative tool to force victims to endure 
additional abuse. As long as a victim knows that a batterer intends to 
publicize this information and finds his threats credible, he may well 
stay in an abusive relationship rather than face the potential 
repercussions/8 which could include loss of child custody, 
employment, and family and personal relationships.19 
17. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORT ON 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, (Oct. 6, 1998) (stating 
the prevalence of the fear of homophobic reaction by family members), available at 
http://www.lambda.orgldv97.html. 
18. Vaughn v. Odom, 1988 WL 15711 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1988) (considering a 
complaint for outrageous conduct and extortionate threats against defendant who, when 
plaintiff attempted to terminate the relationship, threatened to tell plaintiff's family and 
employers about their homosexual affair); Knauer, supra note 15, at 337 ("Homophobia in 
the United States often prompts (or forces) individuals in same-sex relationships to 
conceal their relationship or at least the sex of their partner."); Claire Renzetti, Violence 
in Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in GENDER AND VIOLENCE 287 (Laura L. O'Toole & 
Jessica R. Schiffman eds., 1997) (Claire Renzetti found that 21 % of lesbian battered 
women in her study reported that their partners threatened to "out" them.); Kathleen 
Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Anyone Talk about Gay and Lesbian Domestic Violence?, 18 
T. JEFFERSON. L. REV. 23, 31-32 (1996) (illustrating the powerful tool of homophobia 
used by same-sex batterers); Ros Davidson, Gay-on-Gay Violence: The Gay Community's 
Dirty Secret-Domestic Violence-Is Finally Coming out of the Closet, SALON MAG., Feb. 
1997 (citing threats of "outing" as a powerful tool in battering relationships), available at 
www.salon.comlarchived/1997/news.html. See also Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without 
Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate 
Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 594-96 (1996) ("Another difference in the 
experience of battering for abused lesbian and gay victims is an even greater relative 
isolation than that experienced by abused heterosexual women, which intensifies the 
victim's vulnerability and the batterer's power."). 
19. Knauer, supra note 15, at 337 (chronicling the potential costs of "outing"); Duthu, 
supra note 18, at 31 (elucidating the possible effects of sexual orientation status publicity). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 7 2001-2002
Fall 2001] WHY DOESN'T SHE LEAVE? 7 
C. Immigration status 
Marielle typifies the dilemma facing a significant number of 
immigrant women. An immigrant from Venezuela, she married a 
man who had already obtained his citizenship. Although her 
immigration application was pending, Marielle had not yet obtained 
her green card. Over the course of their relationship, her husband 
repeatedly cheated on her and raped her. He regularly shoved and 
pushed Marielle around their apartment when he was angry. 
Whenever she gathered her belongings in a suitcase or tried to call 
the police, her husband would tell her that he would make sure she 
would be deported if she left. When he began stalking her wherever 
she went, Marielle finally determined that she must risk deportation 
to maintain her safety. 
According to a survey of Latina immigrants in the Washington 
D.C. metropolitan area, threats of deportation are a prevalent and 
powerful tool used in battering relationships.20 The respondents 
ranked fear of reports to the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) and fear of deportation as the two most powerful deterrents to 
leaving an abusive relationship.21 Immigrant women must choose 
between two intimidating prospects: an abusive home life or 
deportation.22 The U.S. House of Representatives recognized this 
catch-22 for victims when it debated the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1994: 
Domestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in 
marriages where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-
citizen's legal status depends on his or her marriage to the 
abuser. Current law fosters domestic violence in such 
situations by placing full and complete control of the alien 
spouse's ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of 
the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, a U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident can, but is not required to, file a petition 
requesting that his or her spouse be granted legal status based 
20. Mary Ann Dutton, Leslye E. Orloff & Giselle Aguilar Hass, Characteristics of 
Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: 
Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 245, 259, 292-93 
(2000). See also Leslye E. Orloff, Deeana Jang & Catherine F. Klein, With No Place to 
Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 325 
n. 52 (1995) (citing the study and that the batterer may use threats of deportation to trap 
her in a battering relationship). 
21. Dutton, supra note 20, at 293. 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993) ("[Battered immigrant women] fear both 
continued abuse if they stay with their batterers and deportation if they attempt to 
leave."). 
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on a valid marriage. Also, the citizen or lawful permanent 
resident can revoke such a petition at any time prior to the 
issuance of permanent or conditional residency to the spouse. 
Consequently, a battered spouse may be deterred from taking 
action to protect himself or herself, such as filing for a civil 
protection order, filing criminal charges, or calling the police 
because of the threat or fear of deportation.23 
Each of these victims - Joanne, Jacques, and Marielle - might 
have a private right of action if the batterer actually divulged the 
personal information. All three victims might be able to sue for 
invasion of privacy24 or intentional infliction of emotional distress.25 
These actions, however, at best would bring the victim only monetary 
damages and offer no relief from the central problem: the proverbial 
cat is already out of the bag. Of course, no legal action could protect 
her from the consequences of bias in a social context. 
Further, although state employment law and the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act may protect people who are HIV 
positive, coverage typically excludes most small employers such as 
day care centers and individuals who employ domestic workers.26 At 
present, there is no federal protection for employment retaliation on 
the basis of sexual orientation.27 Moreover, the expense, futility, and 
length of such suits render legal action of little solace. 
Under the laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, a 
victim of family violence can obtain a protection order if she can 
prove that she has an intimate relationship with the perpetrator and 
that the perpetrator committed an abusive act against her.28 Once a 
23. Id. 
24. See infra Part IV. A. 
25. See, e.g., Horman v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998) (laying out the 
elements of a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). The Supreme Court has 
suggested, however, that the First Amendment may bar recovery where the speech is 
truthful. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (denying recovery for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress for truthful statements about a public figure). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2001); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 296[I][a] (Gould 2001). 
27. The Non-Discrimination in Employment Act, H.R. 2355, which would have 
offered employment protection to gays and lesbians, failed to pass the Senate in 1999. 
28. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (Michie 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3113.31 (Anderson 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Harrison 2000); TEX. FAM. CODE 
§ 81.001 (Vernon 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (1995). See generally Catherine F. 
Klein and Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis 
of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993) (providing an overview of 
state statutes authorizing domestic violence restraining orders); Developments in the Law 
- Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1510, 1514-18, 1535-43 
(1993). 
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victim has proven these elements, she is entitled to relief intended to 
protect her from violence and allow her to live independently from 
the batterer. The forms of relief generally associated with protection 
orders are "stay away" and no contact provisions - the perpetrator 
must stay away from the victim's person and home and may not 
contact her by phone or in writing. However, many state statutes 
offer broad relief in addition to these basic provisions. Under D.C. 
law, for example, the court is authorized to grant whatever relief is 
"appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter.,,29 Thirty-nine 
other jurisdictions offer a broad, catch-all provision under their civil 
domestic violence laws.3D Under this statutory hook, advocates can 
propose remedies designed to stop the violence and to allow the 
victim to stay out of the battering relationship. The judge can 
specifically tailor the injunction to circumstances. It is under such 
provisions that victims like those illustrated above could obtain 
effective court-ordered protection. 
For example, these statutes implicitly authorize a court to direct 
a perpetrator not to divulge certain information about the victim. In 
order to protect Joanne, for example, the court could include a 
provision that reads: "The Respondent shall not directLy or indirectLy 
reveaL any information about the Petitioner's health status to 
Petitioner's empLoyer or to any individuaLs associated with the Wilson 
29. D.C CODE ANN. 16-1005(c)(1O) (1995). 
30. ALA CODE § 30-5-7(c)(9) (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(16) (Michie 
2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-3502(g)(6) (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
205(a)(7)(A) (Michie 2001); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6322 (West 2001); COLO REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-14-102 (15)(G) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-15(b) (2001); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(k) (West 2001); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1)(e) (Michie 2001); 750 ILL. 
ADMIN. COMPo STAT. 60/214(17) (West 2001); IOWA CODE § 236.5(2) (2001); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(h) (Banks-Baldwin 
2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.2135(A) (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209-A § 3 
(2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19-A § 4007; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 600.2950(1)(j) 
(Michie 2001); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01.6.12 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §93-21-13 (2001); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 455.050 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(1)(g) (2001); NEV. REV. 
STAT. 33.030 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-
5(A)(7) (Michie 2001); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842(i) (Gould 2001); N.C GEN. STAT. § 
50B-3(a)(13) (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.4 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 6108(a)(1O) (West 2001); R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-15-3 (2001); S.C CODE ANN. § 20-
4-60 (Law. Co-op 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5(6) (Michie 2001); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 85.022(a)(3) (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.2(2)(g) (2001); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(7) (Michie 2001); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(f) (2001); WYO STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(a)(vi) (Michie 
2001). 
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school with intent to cause emotional distress or harass the Petitioner, 
except pursuant to subpoena or court order." Under D.C. law, 
provisions such as this one have been granted in civil protection 
orders.3! 
In most jurisdictions, protection orders are enforceable by 
criminal contempt proceedings.32 As is the case where the batterer 
violates a stay away provision, he would be accountable to the court 
for non-compliance with a speech restriction .. Violation of this order, 
therefore, would potentially subject the perpetrator to a fine or jail 
time, which increases the order's effectiveness.33 
31. See, e.g., Carrasco v. Ruiz, IF 3206-97 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Intrafamily 
Branch, Dec. 19, 1997) (prohibiting Respondent from contacting any government agency 
about Petitioner except pursuant to subpoena). 
32. ALA. CODE § 30-SA-6; ALASKA STAT. §9.S0.01O(S) (Michie 1997); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 13-3602(J) (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § S-S3-134 (Michie 2001); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 166(c)(1) (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.S(7) (2001); DEL.' CODE 
ANN. Tit. 11, § 1271A(b) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1OOS (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
741.30(8)(a) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-
lO77(l)(g) (2001); IDAHO STAT. §7-601(S) (Michie 2000); 7S0 ILL COMPo STAT. 60/223-6 
(West 1998); IOWA CODE § 236.8 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (2001); Ky. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 403.760(1) (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137 (West 2001); MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-S08 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19, § 4011 (2000); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS § 600.29S0(23) (2001); MINN. STAT. § S18B.Ol(14)(f)-(g) (1997); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1998); Nv. ST. 8 DIST. CT. RULE. S.22(g)(2)(2oo0); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §173-B:8(II) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-9 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-13-S(B) (Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 21S.51(b) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ SOB-4(b) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
270S.02 (Anderson 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.720(4) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 
6114 (1998); RI. GEN. LAWS § lS-1S-3(d) (2001); S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(b) (2000); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-61O(a) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.S06 (Vernon 2000); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit IS, § 1108(e) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.S0.110(S) (1997); Wyo. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-28-107 (Michie 2001). 
33. One wonders, even if the court has authority to grant such a provision, would a 
batterer be truly deterred from revealing this information by a simple civil court order? If 
a victim were to leave a battering relationship based on what turned out to be the false 
promise that a court order would protect the secrecy of this information, these orders may 
actually prove detrimental to a victim. Such a provision would deprive the victim of the 
opportunity to effectively conduct and rely on her own risk assessment. Reliance on an 
exaggerated perception of the effectiveness of such a provision would dramatically distort 
her assessment. 
The effectiveness of a speech restriction is consistent with the effectiveness of any 
protection order provision. Protection orders are most successful at deterring the 
behavior of perpetrators who have committed low-level violence. ADELE HARRELL, 
BARBARA SMITH & LISA NEWMARK, COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF 
RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS SO-S7 (Urban Instit. 1993) 
(analyzing the effectiveness of protection orders and suggesting that they are most 
effective when the perpetrator has a minimal criminal history); Elizabeth Topliffe, Note, 
Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence But Mutual 
Protective Orders are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039, 1046-1047 (1992) ("When issued and 
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At first blush, the domestic violence speech restriction proposed 
above may appear to offend the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.34 Fearing reversal, a judge might initially refuse to issue 
such an order that blatantly restricts speech in a seemingly content-
based fashion. However, as this Article demonstrates, the denial or 
invalidation of such an injunction would depend on an unnecessarily 
rigid interpretation of the First Amendment in light of the type of 
speech involved and the state's interests in issuing the protection 
order. 
II. Content Based or Content Neutral? 
In order to assess the constitutionality of the injunction, a court 
would first determine the level of scrutiny appropriate to this speech 
restriction by classifying the provision as content neutral or content 
based.35 Judicial categorization of speech restrictions between these 
two categories can be highly outcome-determinative, since the 
standard for determining the constitutionality of a content-based 
enforced, civil protection orders appear to be effective against batterers who are not 
extremely violent.") (citing P. FINN AND S. COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND 
ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990». See also Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An 
Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'y REV. 51, 
54 (2000) (suggesting that studies finding mixed results for the effectiveness of protection 
orders are misleading because the sample focused on abusers with a substantial criminal 
history). See generally Susan L. Keilitz, Civil Protection Orders: A Viable Justice System 
Tool for Deterring Domestic Violence, 9 VIOL. & VICTIMS 79 (1994) (stating that some 
studies have found that protective orders can be effective at reducing domestic violence 
and suggesting ways of improving their effectiveness). Further, studies show that civil 
protection orders can be effective at reducing violence when the batterer is aware of the 
existence of strong enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra 
note 28 (arguing that effectiveness of protection orders relies on substantial monitoring, 
enforcement efforts, and strict punishment for violations); Topliffe, supra at 1046-47 
(stating that protection orders can be effective, but that the effectiveness depends on 
statutory enforcement mechanisms and police cooperation). Vital elements of effective 
protection orders are police cooperation with enforcement, community knowledge of such 
cooperation, and criminal penalties for violations. Developments in the Law, supra note 
28. 
34. It ts established th'at a court's issuance of an order of protection satisfies the state 
action requirement and therefore implicates constitutional requirements. Clouterbuck v. 
Clouterbuck, 556 A.2d 1082, 1085 n. 3 (D.C. 1989) ("There is no question that the 
government's involvement in the issuance of.a [protection order] rises to a level that 
satisfies the state action requirement of the Due Process Clause."). 
35. It would be misleading to suggest that courts systematically categorize based on 
definitive principles. In fact, outcomes of categorization efforts are hardly consistent. 
Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936, 946 
(1987) (commenting on the inconsistency of Supreme Court analysis of speech 
restrictions). 
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speech restriction is much more exacting. 
A. A domestic violence speech restriction would most likely survive 
constitutional scrutiny if characterized as content neutral 
If the court characterized this injunction as content neutral, it 
would be far more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.36 For a 
content-neutral restriction to be constitutionally sound, it simply 
needs to serve a significant government interest and be narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.37 For this reason, advocates and 
commentators have attempted to characterize similar speech 
restrictions as content neutra1.38 However, because this argument 
contorts First Amendment jurisprudence this Article will pause only 
briefly to analyze the viability of this characterization. 
Courts commonly classify restrictions regulating the time, place, 
or manner of the speech as content neutra1.39 Several principles assist 
courts in identifying such content-neutral restrictions. Two of these 
principles may be relevant to the analysis:40 1. The issuing government 
actor had a purpose for adopting the restriction independent of the 
content of the speech; or 2. The prohibition targets conduct rather 
than speech and therefore implicates lesser First Amendment 
36. See, e.g., Ambassador Books & Video v. Little Rock, 20 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding a content-neutral city ordinance); Paulsen v. Gotbaum, 982 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 
1992) (upholding a city permitting regulation as a valid time, place, manner restriction). 
37. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753,762 (1994). 
38. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
39. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 369 (1997) (applying a less 
exacting standard of review to an injunction because "it merely restricts the volume, 
location, timing and harassing and intimidating nature of defendants' expressive speech.") 
(quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue Western N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1433 
(W.D.N.Y.1992». 
40. A third rationale used by the courts is the secondary effects doctrine that is 
closely tied to the speech as conduct principle. Under the secondary effects doctrine, a 
court may classify a speech restriction as content neutral because the "target of the 
[restriction] is the secondary effect of .. , [the] conduct ... not its expressive content." 
Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), 
cert. granted, 921 P.2d 602 (1996). The secondary effects doctrine, however, offers meager 
assistance in an effort to characterize a domestic violence speech restriction as content 
neutral. The secondary effect of the baUerer's speech would be the victim's emotional 
distress or loss of employment. In Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court held that "emotive 
impact of speech" is not a secondary effect that would transform a speech restriction into a 
content-neutral prohibition. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). The California 
Supreme Court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal's reliance on the secondary 
effects doctrine in upholding the Avis injunction. Because the secondary effect of the 
defendant's racist speech would amount to the emotional impact on the listener, the court 
found the lower court's reliance untenable in light of Boos. 
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concerns. 
1. Neutral purpose without reference to content 
In identifying content-neutral speech restrictions, the Supreme 
Court inquires "whether the government has adopted a [restriction] 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. A 
[restriction] that serves purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on 
some speakers' messages but not others.,,41 In short, a restriction is 
content neutral if it is "justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech.,,42 For this inquiry, the government's purpose in 
adopting the restriction is the "threshold consideration.,,43 
Recently, in Hill v. CoLorado, the Supreme Court upheld a state 
statute that created a "bubble zone" around people approaching 
health care facilities. The statute precluded individuals from 
breaching the bubble zone to distribute leaflets to, counsel, educate, 
or otherwise protest those entering the health care facility. In order 
to confirm that the state employed content-neutral justifications for 
enacting the legislation, the Court looked to the legislative history of 
the statute.44 The Court found that the statute was content neutral 
because the state's interest in restricting the speech focused 
exclusively on protecting access to health care, privacy, and on 
providing the police with guidelines for enforcement.45 
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of an injunction creating a "buffer zone" around 
abortion clinic entrances and driveways. The district court had issued 
the injunction after the protesters had blocked access to an abortion 
clinic and harassed doctors at their homes, in defiance of an earlier 
injunction.46 Determining that the buffer zone injunction was content 
neutral, the Court upheld the injunction against a constitutional 
41. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted). 
42. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 
512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,320-21 
(1988); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984); Heffron 
v. Int'I Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (quoting Virginia 
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976». 
43. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763. 
44. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20. 
45. [d. The Supreme Court also found two other bases for concluding that the statute 
was adopted without reference to content. However, the Court noted that each element 
provided a sufficient independent basis for the Court's conclusion. 
46. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759. 
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challenge.47 Again, the Court based its analysis on the state court's 
intent in crafting the injunction. The Court determined the lower 
court's intent was simply to protect those entering abortion clinics 
from the conduct of those who had violated the court's original 
order.48 The Court found the lower court's intent completely 
unrelated to the protesters' message. 
While the speech restrictions in both Hill and Madsen above de 
facto restrict speech of those who espouse one viewpoint, the Court 
considered this effect irrelevant to the content inquiry.49 The 
Supreme Court maintained that the sole consideration under this 
principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is the stated intent of the 
restriction's drafters, not the effect the content-neutral injunction may 
have on those whose speech is enjoined.so 
Superficially, a domestic violence speech restriction might appear 
to be content neutral when assessed based on the issuing court's 
intent. To be entitled to a protection order, the victim must prove 
that the batterer has committed abusive acts toward her.sl To 
illustrate her need for a speech restriction, the victim must provide 
evidence that the batterer threatened to publicize personal 
information about her if she left. Without the latter evidence, the 
victim would not have proven that the relief is "necessary to the 
effective resolution of the matter."S2 At the close of evidence, a court 
would have ample justification to restrain the batterer's speech about 
specific issues related to the victim. Such an order would be 
necessary to protect the victim from retaliation, harassment, and 
invasion of privacy. These purposes are completely unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas. If the court intended to suppress the content of 
the speech without regard to the protection of the victim, the 
injunction would read broadly to prohibit publication to any audience 
of the personal facts at issue. Instead, the injunction would preclude 
the batterer from publicizing the facts only in the ways that would 
subject the victim to harassment and invasion of privacy. 
47. [d. at 753. 
48. [d. at 763. 
49. [d. 
50. Of course, the identification of legislative or judicial intent is fraught with 
subjective interpretation. In practice, courts may identify a content-neutral justification 
simply so that they may uphold the restriction. 
51.. See supra note 28 for reference to various state statutes identifying the evidence a 
victim must produce to be entitled a protection order. 
52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the statutory cites and language that 
authorizes a court to issue a speech restriction in the domestic violence context. 
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However, although one might successfully argue that the issuing 
court crafted the injunction entirely without reference to the content 
or viewpoint of the speech to be enjoined, the injunction would still 
explicitly forbid the discussion of specific topics. In contrast, neither 
of the speech restrictions analyzed in Hill and Madsen targeted 
specific topics.53 The injunction and statute proscribed speech in 
specific locations delivered in a specific manner.54 Therefore, in 
addition to being adopted without reference to viewpoint and 
content, both speech restrictions prohibited all speech delivered in a 
specific manner in specific locations. Because it enjoins speech of a 
specific content, a domestic violence speech restriction does not bear 
the central characteristic of constitutionality that is endemic to time, 
place, manner restrictions. Although not explicitly stated by the 
courts, it is axiomatic that in order to satisfy the test for content 
neutrality by looking to the state's purpose, an injunction would also 
need to be silent as to the specific content of the restricted speech. 
2. Content-neutral proscriptions on conduct 
Courts characterize some restrictions on speech as content 
neutral because the regulation or injunction primarily prohibits 
conduct rather than speech. Although speech may get "swept up 
incidentally within the reach of a· statute directed at conduct rather 
than speech,,,55 courts often find that such a restriction poses only a 
minimal burden on speech. The Supreme Court articulated this 
principle as follows: "It has never been deemed an abridgement of 
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely 
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by 
f I ,,56 means 0 anguage .... 
A typical illustration of this principle is harassment statutes. 57 
53. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (determining the constitutionality of a 
"bubble zone" around individuals entering health care facilities in which protesters cannot 
distribute leaflets or offer counseling or advice); Madsen, v. Women's Health Center 512 
U.S. 753 (analyzing an injunction creating a buffer zone around abortion clinic entrances 
such that demonstrators could not protest or distribute their message). See also Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (characterizing as content neutral a regulation 
proscribing volume guidelines for outdoor concerts). 
54. Hill, 530 U.S. 703; Madsen 512 U.S. 753 .. 
55. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992). 
56. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). 
57. Stalking statutes also pass constitutional muster as content-neutral restrictions. 
At least forty-eight states and the District of Columbia criminalize stalking. M. Katherine 
Boychuck, Comment, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad? 88 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 769, 769 n.l (1994) (listing stalking laws in existence at time of publication). In 
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Courts construe these statutes as criminalizing the act of speaking in a 
harassing fashion. That the conduct is expressive does not transform 
the statutes into content-driven speech restrictions. For example, the 
Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a telephone harassment 
statute because it "[ c ]learly ... regulates conduct, not mere speech. 
What is proscribed is the making of a telephone call, with the 
requisite intent and in the specified manner.,,58 Finding that verbal 
harassment statutes are not directed at "the communication of 
opinions or ideas, but at conduct," courts uniformly uphold these 
statutes as valid proscriptions on speech.59 
Courts have also found that, under certain circumstances, 
employment discrimination laws regulate conduct rather than speech 
even when the proscribable behavior is verbal. The Supreme Court 
in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul intimated in dictum that certain words 
may be constitutionally proscribable when they violate a statute 
aimed at conduct. 
[F]or example, sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among 
other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general 
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment 
practices. Where the government does not target conduct on 
the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from 
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea 
or philosophy.60 
Since fighting words do not ever enjoy constitutional protection, 
the Court's reference to them is unremarkable.61 However, the 
Court's inclusion of the emphasized phrase, "among other words," 
suggests that the Court would permit enjoining otherwise protected 
speech if that speech were to amount to discriminatory conduct. 
The California Supreme Court recently upheld another 
injunction based on content-neutral regulation of speech in Aguilar v. 
nearly every stalking statute, stalking consists of some form of communication, whether it 
is repeated verbal contact with the intent to harass or threats to do bodily harm. Yet the 
majority of stalking statutes are upheld against First Amendment challenges. See United 
States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 383 n.7 (D.C. 1996) (listing stalking statutes and the 
outcomes of their constitutional challenges). 
58. Gormley v. Director, 632 F.2d 928, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1023 (1980). . 
59. Florida v. Elder, 382 So.2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980); Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 
243 (1988) ("We agree ... that [the harassment statute] prohibits conduct and not 
protected speech."). 
60. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389-90 (emphasis added). 
61. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 17 2001-2002
Fall 2001] WHY DOESN'T SHE LEAVE? 17 
Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.62 The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari review of the injunction. In A vis, the trial court found that 
an A vis supervisor had harassed Latino employees by using racial 
slurs and by leveling unfounded accusations at them on the job, 
thereby violating the state anti-discrimination law.63 The lower court 
issued an injunction against Avis prohibiting its agents from using any 
derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at or descriptive of 
Hispanic or Latino employees.64 In concluding that the injunction was 
constitutionally valid, the California Supreme Court relied upon its 
observation that the injunction targeted the act of employment 
discrimination.65 Discriminating against an individual on the job, the 
court reasoned, is primarily conduct, whether or not accompanied by 
speech.66 
A court would be hard pressed to find that a domestic violence 
speech restriction targets only conduct Although, like harassment 
statutes this injunction proscribes speech that amounts to harassment, 
the proposed domestic violence speech restriction goes farther than 
harassment statues by specifying the content of. the barred harassing 
communication.67 Harassment laws are constitutional in part because 
62. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1138 (2000). . 
63. [d. at 849. 
64. [d. at 850 ("Defendant John Lawrence shall cease and desist from using any 
derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino 
employees of Avis Rent A Car System, Inc .... as long as he is employed by Avis Rent A 
Car System, Inc., in California."). The California Court of Appeals remanded the case to 
the trial court to redraft the injunction to limit its application to the workplace. [d. The 
Court of Appeals also directed the trial court to include an illustrative list of derogatory 
epithets in order to provide the defendant with adequate notice of what constitutes 
prohibited speech. [d. 
65. Although the Avis Court hinted heavily that it upheld the injunction because it 
regulated conduct and was narrowly tailored to meet an important state interest, the court 
never explicitly stated the basis for its conclusion that the injunction is constitutionally 
permissible. The Court seemed satisfied to cite to Supreme Court precedent holding that 
the First Amendment permits the imposition of civil liability for speech amounting to 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [d. at 854-55. 
66. [d. at 854. 
67. The typical protection order directs the batterer not to harass the victim. See, e.g., 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(9) (West 2000) (permitting a court to enjoin harassment). 
Protection orders including such provisions have withstood First Amendment challenges. 
See Schramek V. Schramek, 429 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a 
restraining order's no contact provision does not infringe on free speech because it is 
directed not at speech but at the suppression of physical abuse). See generally, Klein & 
Orloff, supra note 28, at 905-10 (reviewing decisions related to the constitutionality of 
protection orders). However, this language would be too vague to proscribe harassment 
consisting of divulging personal information about the victim. 
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they are silent as to the actual content of the harassing speech. It is 
too far a stretch, then, to assert that an injunction that prohibits the 
discussion of certain topics enjoins only harassing conduct. An 
additional complication arises because the privacy-invading speech at 
issue does not constitute illegal behavior under any statute. 68 In both 
the R.A. V. dictum and the A vis case, the courts noted that the speech 
to be restrained violated a valid statute.69 
An advocate might consider proposing an injunction that facially 
enjoins conduct rather than content. For example, in analyzing the 
A vis decision, Professor Charles Calleros propounds a theory that 
injunctions issued in employment discrimination cases, if properly 
drafted, should always regulate in a content-neutral fashion.70 
Relying on R.A. v., Professor Calleros concludes that the government 
"may selectively regulate less than an entire category of proscribable 
speech if it does So on the basis of the 'conduct' of selectively 
targeting victims rather than the content of the speech directed at the 
victims.,,71 In order to illustrate his point, Professor Calleros proposes 
an alternative formulation of the injunction issued in A vis, which 
would assure its constitutionality.72 
Although the injunction might identify the specifics of past 
unlawful speech, it need not, and perhaps should not, enjoin only 
certain words or views. It instead· could enjoin the supervisor from 
continuing to target Latino employees on the basis of their race or 
national origin from unwelcome and distracting, humiliating, or 
intimidating speech or conduct, if the speech or conduct could 
substantially interfere with their work when viewed cumulatively.73 
In short, the re-conceived injunction would enjoin any expressive 
conduct that, described broadly, would violate anti-discrimination 
laws. 
Although the R.A. V. dictum emboldened Professor Calleros to 
assert that injunctions prohibiting certain types of harassing or 
discriminatory speech might qualify as content neutral, R.A. V. offers 
68. In some states, threats to divulge information may constitute blackmail, see infra 
Part Ill.B., but the actual utterance of the words would not necessarily violate any statute. 
69. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1992); Avis, 980 P.2d at 854. 
70. Charles Calleros, Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.: The California Supreme 
Court Takes a Divided Freeway to Content-Oriented Regulation of Workplace Speech, 34 
U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 236-64 (2000). 
71. Id. at 266. 
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text to review the injunction upheld by the 
Avis Court. 
73. Calleros, supra note 70, at 292. 
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little useful guidance to advocates seeking to craft a constitutionally 
permissible domestic violence speech restriction. The contortions 
that Professor Caller os performs to create an injunction that targets 
conduct would result in an injunction that is overbroad and vague. A 
domestic violence speech restriction following Professor Calleros' 
formulation would read as follows: "The Respondent shall not conduct 
himself in any way that shall humiliate, taunt, or antagonize the 
Petitioner if the conduct is substantially likely to result in negative 
repercussions for the Petitioner." This injunction prohibits the speech 
the victim fears without any reference to content. However, it gives 
no guidance to the batterer regarding what conduct is prohibited and 
sweeps far more broadly than necessary. In trying to wrestle the 
injunction into a content-neutral formulation, an advocate would 
eviscerate its effectiveness and render it unconstitutional on 
overbreadth grounds. Even definitional acrobatics fail to transform 
this injunction into a content-neutral restriction. 
B. This injunction likely would be characterized as a content-based 
restriction subject to higher judicial scrutiny 
Although advocates may be tempted to argue that a domestic 
violence speech restriction is content neutral and therefore subject to 
lower level scrutiny, First Amendment jurisprudence reveals that 
most courts would construe the injunction as content based.74 Indeed, 
the issuing court restricts the content of the batterer's message rather 
than the manner or venue in which it is delivered. First year law 
students often learn that courts apply a bright line test to each 
74. Advocates who have argued on appeal in favor of domestic violence speech 
restrictions have followed this path, asserting that the restriction is content neutral. From 
an advocacy perspective, such an argument appears safer. If the court agreed that the 
restriction was content neutral, it would be likely to uphold the injunction against a First 
Amendment challenge. Arguing that a narrowly drawn injunction serves an important 
state interest would not be challenged in most courts. Recognizing protection against 
extortion, privacy, and freedom from harassment, a court may well identify an important 
state interest is served by the injunction. The more challenging threshold argument, 
however, that the injunction is content neutral, requires more argument than given by 
advocates to date. Amicus Brief for Appellee at 27-28, Ruiz v. Carrasco, IF 3206-97 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Intrafamily Branch, Dec. 19, 1997) (No. 98-FM-39 & 98-FM-40) 
(2001) (arguing in two paragraphs that an injunction prohibiting the appellant from 
contacting any government official about the appellee is content neutral because it targets 
his conduct rather than the content and was adopted without regard to the message the 
speech conveys); Brief for Appellee at 27, Ruiz v. Carrasco, IF 3206-97 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
Fam. Div. Intrafamily Branch, Dec. 19, 1997) (Appeal No. 98-FM-39 & 98-FM-40) (2001) 
(arguing in one paragraph that the injunction is content neutral because it was issued 
under a content-neutral statute). 
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content-based restriction to determine its viability. This test 
constitutes strict scrutiny analysis, which assesses whether the burden 
on speech is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, whether 
the injunction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest, and whether 
alternative avenues for communication exises In fact, the reality of 
First Amendment jurisprudence is far murkier.76 Contemporary First 
Amendment jurisprudence reflects a free form balancing77 of state 
interests against speech.78 Acknowledging the inevitability of judicial 
75. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
76. The murky waters of First Amendment jurisprudence may be attributable, at least 
in part, to the eternal debate over the central, unifying theory behind the Free Speech 
Clause. Jurists and commentators have long debated and struggled with the rationale 
informing First Amendment protection. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 
(1971) ("[The First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove governmental 
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall 
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will 
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that 
no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon 
which our political system rests."); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION (1970) (examining the theoretical framework of the First Amendment); 
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment 
and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 506 (1995) 
(identifying broad values espoused by the First Amendment including generally, the free 
market place in ideas); Mary Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. CR.-CL. 
L. REV. 1, 22 (1990) ("The following justifications [for the First Amendment] are most 
frequently offered: (1) speech enables citizens to make decisions required for self-
governance; (2) speech advances the search for truth; and (3) speech enhances self-
realization and the individual's potential for growth and advancement."); Richard 
Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action Calling for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name 
Calling, 17 HARV. CR.-CL. L. REV. 133, 175 (1982) (citing four other purposes behind 
the First Amendment). 
77. Although the author takes no position in the on-going debate about the 
normative value of balancing, she asserts that Supreme Court jurisprudence is testimony 
to its existence. For commentary on balancing, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Shielding Children and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141 (1997); T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 671 (1983). 
78. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-54 (1983) (balancing the right of public 
employees to speak on matters of public concern against the state interest in governance); 
Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1975) 
(chronicling the development of the doctrine protecting free speech in the context of 
commercial information and stressing that the nature of the speech affects the analysis); 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Will County, 391 U.S. 563,570 n.3 (1968) (stating that there 
are no absolutes in the area of speech in government employment because "it is possible 
to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the need for confidentiality is 
so great that even completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground 
for dismissal."); Scheetz v. Morning Call, 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("Before 
this court can balance these rights, it notes that balancing is legitimate. Time and time 
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balancing, Justice Harlan wrote "[w]henever ... [First Amendment] 
protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental 
powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires 
an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved. ,,79 
Typically, content-based restrictions that withstand this scrutiny 
fall into one of the categories that the courts have segregated from 
the protective reach of the First Amendment, such as fighting words,BO 
defamation,8! obscenity,82 and advocacy of imminent lawless 
behavior.83 However, content-based restrictions that do not fall into 
one of these categories are not per se invalid. Instead, after 
balancing, a court may find that the restriction fits into what the 
Supreme Court refers to as "a more general exception for content 
discrimination that does not threaten the censorship of ideas.,,84 
A court facing a constitutional challenge to a domestic violence 
speech restriction would have no direct precedent to which to turn. 
Although at least one court has granted such a restriction, none has 
again, the Court, though reasserting that the rights protected by the First Amendment are 
fundamental, has made clear that any restriction on speech - even a prior restraint -
may be permissible if sufficiently compelling reasons warrant it.") (citations omitted); 
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 38 (Cal. 1971) (suggesting that the court 
undertakes free form balancing on an ad hoc basis by indicating that some speech is more 
deserving of protection than others, even within the realm of the press). See also Ronald 
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search for "Central 
Meaning" of the First Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1616-17 (2000) ("The Supreme 
Court's rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, much contemporary First Amendment 
case law reflects direct cost/benefit analysis of proposed speech activity."); Aleinikoff, 
supra note 77, at 943 (stating that balancing in constitutional reasoning is widespread); 
Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936 (1987) 
(asserting that courts routinely balance First Amendment rights against state interests to 
one degree or another); Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (1976) (stating that First Amendment protections are fluid 
such that efforts at classifying certain speech as within or outside the ambit of 
constitutional protection is impossible); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from 
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CAL. L. REV. 935, 941 (1968) (highlighting the prevalence of balancing in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, analyzing its ad hoc nature, and concluding "1 do not know 
how to avoid the logical conclusion from this that there is no constitutional guarantee to 
freedom of expression."). But cf Volokh, supra note 77, at 167-68 (arguing that balancing 
is a tautological answer to the problem of comparing intangibles). 
79. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961). 
80. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
81. /d.; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
U.S. 250 (1952). . 
82. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
83. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
84. R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992). 
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resulted in an appellate decision.8s Because privacy-invading speech 
in a domestic violence context does not fall into one of the 
predetermined categories of unprotected speech, the court would 
therefore engage in balancing, weighing the value of the speech 
against the countervailing interests to be protected by the injunction. 
III. In the Balance: The Value of Speech 
When a statute or injunction restricts speech that has no First 
Amendment value a court assessing the constitutionality of the 
restriction need not conduct a balancing test. Although the 
restriction might be struck on vagueness grounds, it does not 
unconstitutionally infringe on free speech. Therefore, any analysis of 
the constitutionality of a domestic violence speech restriction should 
begin with an examination of the speech itself; for if it is not protected 
speech, any injunction would stand, regardless of the interests 
involved. In reality, the constitutional assessment of speech is rarely 
a zero sum game. Only speech that falls into one of the unprotected 
classifications is categorically accorded no First Amendment 
protection. Most other speech falls somewhere along a continuum 
between protected and unprotected expression.86 Its placement along 
that continuum indicates the weight a court allocates to the speech 
when balancing it against state interests in restraining the speech. 
A. Importance of context 
The context of the speech is vital to determining its place along 
the continuum87 - its level of constitutional protection.88 Of course, 
85. Carrasco v. Ruiz, IF 3206-97 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Intrafamily Branch, Dec. 
19,1997). 
86. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Our First Amendment 
decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core 
political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and 
nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class expression; 
obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all."); Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) ("This Court on many occasions 
has recognized that certain kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First 
Amendment than others .... "). 
87. The relationship between the speech and the intent of the First Amendment can 
also influence the value a court ascribes to speech. Sometimes particular expression will 
be accorded little or no First Amendment protection because it does not serve these goals. 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court noted that they have sanctioned 
exceptions to First Amendment protection where the speech constitutes "no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from it [is] clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In United States 
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time, place, manner doctrine illustrates the importance of context, 
since it is commonly accepted that a state may regulate speech more 
freely if the restriction is based on the venue of the communication or 
the way in which it is delivered.89 Justice Holmes' famous 
hypothetical in u.s. v. Schenck further illustrates the influence of 
venue: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.,,90 
In Schenck, the Supreme Court illustrated the importance of 
contextual intangibles in ascribing constitutional value to speech. The 
Court considered whether a document produced by the Socialist 
party urging draft obstruction exposed its authors to prosecution 
under the Espionage Act of 1917. The Court determined that the 
First Amendment did not insulate the defendants from prosecution 
because the speech enjoyed no constitutional protection. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court took heavily into consideration that the 
country was at war. "We admit that in many places and in ordinary 
times the defendants in saying all that was in the circular, would have 
been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act 
v. Valasquez, the Seventh Circuit upheld a statute criminalizing threats to retaliate against 
a government witness because "[a] threat to break a person's knees or pulverize his 
automobile as punishment for his having given information to the government is a 
statement of intention rather than an idea or opinion and is not part of the marketplace of 
ideas." United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985). While a particular 
utterance may not be diametrically opposed to speech serving First Amendment goals, a 
court may accord it lesser First Amendment value because of its attenuated connection to 
the furtherance of those goals. As one California court explained, "as speech strays 
farther from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free exchange of ideas ... the state has 
greater latitude to regulate the expression." People v. Borrelli, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 859 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991». 
However, because the goals of the First Amendment are a topic of perennial scholarly and 
jurisprudential debate, it is futile to conduct a reliable assessment of the value of speech 
based on this principle. See supra note 76 for more discussion of the goals of the First 
Amendment. 
88. Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? 
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Work Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 
420 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of context in First Amendment jurisprudence and 
highlighting its impact on the degree of protection the speech is accorded). See, e.g., 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 426-7 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The meaning and the 
legitimacy of its regulation can only be determined in context."); /d. at 429 (Stevens, J. 
concurring) ("[T]he scope of protection provided expressive activity depends in part upon 
its content and character."); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,778 (1982) ("[W]hether a 
specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment always requires some 
consideration of both its content and its context."). 
89. See supra Part IIA. 
90. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 24 2001-2002
24 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29: 
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.,,91 
The Supreme Court's decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies presents a fairly dramatic illustration of the 
importance of context to First Amendment analysis.92 . In Milk 
Wagon, the Court reviewed an order enjoining protesters from 
picketing a dairy. While the Court acknowledged that the First 
Amendment ordinarily protects protesting, it upheld the injunction 
based on the defendants' prior conduct. The record revealed that 
multiple incidents of violence had accompanied the defendants' prior 
protests, including beatings, window smashing, and 100ting.93 Because 
of the violent background of the protesting, the Court found that 
even peaceful protesting had acquired a coercive taint. The Court 
concluded that "acts which in isolation are peaceful may be part of a 
coercive thrust when entangled with acts of violence.,,94 The Court 
held that the First Amendment would not protect such expression 
simply because protesting constituted speech. Instead, the Court 
stressed the importance of a more nuanced consideration of context 
to assess the value of speech: "[U]tterance in a context of violence can 
lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an 
instrument of force. ,,95 
What is the value of speech divulging private information in a 
domestic violence context? Under the modern interpretation of 
fighting words, a court could not conclude that the speech falls into 
this narrow category of unprotected speech. When first articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the definition of 
fighting words was extremely broad, covering words "which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace."% Such a broad definition would permit the regulation of 
nearly any offensive speech. The Court recognized the definition's 
overbreadth, however, and narrowed its reach to include only face-to-
91. [d. at 52. 
92. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Diaries, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) ("Freedom of expression can be 
suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an 
inseparable part of it."); Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 
("Conduct which alone would constitute protected activities may be actionable if it is part 
of a common plan that includes activity that is clearly unprotected."). 
93. Milk Wagon, 312 U.S. at 291-92. 
94. [d. at 294. 
95. [d. at 293. 
96. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
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face encounters that are likely to provoke immediate violence.97 
Addressed to a third party and unlikely to provoke imminent 
violence, speech divulging personal information about a battered 
partner does not implicate the fighting words exception.98 
In an effort to ascribe a relative constitutional value to privacy-
invading domestic violence speech, one must look to the context in 
which the words would be uttered. These words would be spoken 
after the victim has left the violent relationship. Having failed to 
coerce the victim to stay in the intimate relationship, the batterer 
would inform an employer about the victim's HIV status, for 
example, to retaliate against the victim for her departure. The 
absence of a political or otherwise socially justified motive would be 
illustrated by his prior coercive threats to divulge the information and 
by his failure to circulate the information when the victim remained 
in the relationship. An Oklahoma court stated that the Constitution 
was never intended generally to protect speech in the context of 
domestic violence: "We [] reject any notion that the First 
Amendment ... ever covered threatening or abusive communications 
to persons who have demonstrated a need for protection from an 
immediate and present danger of domestic abuse.,,99 Under this 
general analysis, the constitutional value of privacy-invading domestic 
violence speech is low and would not appear to weigh heavily in the 
balance against countervailing interests. 
B. Protection of analogous extortionate speech 
ExtortionatelOO speech provides a useful analog to privacy-
invading speech in a domestic violence context. Because the speech is 
97. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,20 (1971). 
98. Despite the Cohen Court's significant narrowing of the doctrine, Professor 
Charles Lawrence presents a powerful argument that racist speech could be characterized 
as fighting words because face-to-face racist speech is the functional equivalent of fighting 
words as defined by the Cohen Court. According to Professor Lawrence, the Cohen Court 
envisioned fighting words exchanged between people of equal bargaining power who were 
empowered to retaliate. See Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990). 
99. Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
100. I will interchangeably use the terms blackmail and extortion to refer to this type 
of behavior. Although historically courts and legislatures may have drawn some 
distinction between the two conducts, that distinction has become nebulous. James 
Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673 (1984) 
("The terms blackmail and extortion are often used interchangeably."). See also 
Greenspun v. Gandolfo, 320 P.2d 628, 630 (Nev. 1958) ("Though the word 'blackmail' may 
not be a word of art, it is a word of common parlance and popular usage, often defined as 
synonymous with extortion. "). 
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of a similar nature, the court's assessment of the value of extortionate 
speech suggests the corresponding significance to be ascribed to 
domestic violence speech. Blackmail generally refers to the use of 
threats to gain an advantage by inducing someone to do or refrain 
from doing something they have a legal right to freely do or not do. 
Blackmail statutes criminalize speech intended not to communicate 
any expressive content, but only to attain personal gain. Similarly, 
the batterer utters privacy-invading words not with the intent to 
benignly communicate ideas, but to achieve personal vindication. 
Often, blackmail statutes criminalize threats to commit what would 
otherwise be legal actions outside the context of the threat. 101 In the 
same way, the domestic violence speech restriction enjoins speech 
that might otherwise be protected if uttered outside the context of a 
domestic violence relationship. Moreover, the privacy-invading 
speech garners a coercive patina similar to extortionate speech 
because the batterer used the threat of it previously to gain control 
over the victim. Identifying the unifying elements of blackmail 
statutes both struck and upheld suggests the parameters necessary to 
constitutionally enjoin speech of minimal constitutional value through 
a domestic violence speech restriction.102 
Blackmail statutes constitute part of the familiar fabric of our 
criminal law.103 While these statutes vary greatly in breadth and 
scope,l04 they share one uniform characteristic. They criminalize 
101. See, e.g. FLA. STAT. § 836.05 (2000) and discussion infra Part III.H. 
102. Many commentators have struggled with the inconsistent body of precedent to 
determine the circumstances under which and the reasons why extortionate speech may be 
criminalized. See Lindren supra note 100, at 671 ("Possible rationales for blackmail have 
been presented by some of the leading scholars of this century, including Arthur 
Goodhart, Robert Nozick, Lawrence Friedman, Richard Posner, and Richard Epstein. 
None, however, has successfully explained the crime."). See also State v. Robertson, 649 
P.2d 569, 587 (Or. 1982) ("In sum, our review of the cases that have tested laws against 
extortion, intimidation, or coercion under the First Amendment yields no principled 
guidance on freedom of expression to state verbal demands coupled with verbal threats."). 
103. In addition, a small minority of states recognize a common law tort suit for 
extortion. See, e.g., Zohn v. Menard, Inc., 598 N.W. 2d 323, 329-30 (Iowa 1999) (stating 
that Iowa recognizes a civil cause of action for violation of the criminal extortion statute); 
Furhman v. Cal. Satellite Sys., 786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990) (affirming that California permits 
civil suits for monetary damages on the basis of extortion). 
104. Some statutes criminalize only threats made in order to gain a pecuniary 
advantage. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 25 (Law. Co-op. 2001); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2905.11 (Anderson 2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3923 (West 2001); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (Michie 2001). Other statutes proscribe a broader array of 
threats, made with a variety of intents, to accuse a person of a crime, expose a secret, or 
impair an individual's reputation in any way. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 876 (2001); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN § 14:66 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ch.836.05 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3852 
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speech. Although courts do not characterize extortionate speech as a 
preestablished category of speech that the state may freely enjoin, 
such as fighting words, blackmail statutes are commonly assumed to 
pass constitutional muster. Although some statutes have been struck 
as overbroad, some of the most broad statutes have survived First 
Amendment challenges. 
Federal caselaw reveals a general assumption that extortionate 
speech is within the states' power to prohibit. When commenting on 
the constitutionality of blackmail statutes, federal courts broadly 
confirm their validity. The Fifth Circuit held: "It may categorically be 
stated that extortionate speech has no more constitutional protection 
than that uttered by a robber while ordering his victim to hand over 
the money, which is no protection at all.,,105 Analyzing the 
constitutionality of a government secrecy agreement, the Fourth 
Circuit emphasized that "[t]hreats and bribes are not protected 
simply because they are written or spoken; extortion is a crime 
although it is verbal. ,,106 
When courts undertake a more exacting analysis of the 
constitutionality of blackmail statutes, they generally uphold the 
statute when it is narrowly drawn and prohibits extortionate behavior 
carried out with a specific malicious intent. Some statutes are upheld 
in the absence of an intent requirement if the statute proscribes only 
threats to commit unlawful acts. In those statutes, the unlawful 
conduct requirement allows the court to infer wrongful intent. 
To illustrate a statute that was upheld because it satisfied these 
elements, we look to the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the federal 
extortion statute, 18 U.S.c. § 876.107 The statute provides: 
Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or 
other thing of value, knowingly so deposits [in the postal 
service] any communication ... addressed to any other person 
and containing any threat to injure the property of another or 
reputation of the addressee or of another. .. shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both. I08 
(1999). 
105. United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1975). 
106. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1314 (4th Cir. 1972). See also United 
States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding a retaliation statute that 
punished speech by holding that threats to punish another for his having given testimony 
to the government is a statement of intention rather than an idea or opinion and is 
therefore not protected speech) .. 
107. United States v. Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1988). 
108. 18 U.S.c. § 876 (2001). 
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This statute prohibits a range of threats including threats to take 
actions that are, in themselves, legal. On the face of this statute, for 
example, it would be criminal for a man to send a letter to an intimate 
partner threatening to disseminate damaging personal information 
about her unless she remained in a relationship with him. In United 
States v. Hutson, the court found that the statute survived an 
overbreadth challenge because the statute specifically detailed the 
prohibited conduct and because its intent requirement ensured that it 
would not chill political speech. "The 'intent to extort' requirement 
of section 876 guarantees that the statute reaches only extortionate 
speech, which is undoubtedly within the government's power to 
prohibit."I09 In the court's view, the intent to extort transformed even 
threats to commit otherwise legal acts into criminal behavior. 
State court blackmail jurisprudence is consistent with the Hutson 
decision. The Florida Supreme Court upheld a blackmail statute in 
Carricarte v. State."O The Florida statute at issue criminalized 
utterances which "constitute malicious threats to do injury to 
another's person, reputation or property ... with the intent to extort 
money or the intent to compel another to act or refrain from acting 
against his will."lll The court held that the statute's proscription on 
threats to commit legal actions was not fatal to its constitutionality 
because the statute required malicious intent.1l2 
Finally, a Virginia appeals court upheld the state's blackmail 
statute that prohibited threats to commit legal or illegal acts with 
intent to extort any pecuniary benefit. ll3 The court found that the 
statute did not infringe unconstitutionally on speech because it 
prohibited only speech to accrue pecuniary gain."4 As such, the 
statute contained an implicit intent requirement, requiring threats to 
be committed with an extortionate intent. This requirement 
prevented the statute from sweeping too broadly and proscribing 
protected speech. 
In recent years, courts have invalidated several state blackmail 
statutes on the grounds of overbreadth."s Each invalidated statute 
109. Hutson, 843 F.2d at 1235. 
110. Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1980). 
111. Id. at 1263. 
112. [d. 
113. Stein v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
114. [d. at 241-42. 
115. See, e.g., State v. Weinstein, 898 P.2d 513, 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Whimbush v. 
People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Colo. 1994); Seattle v. Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wash. Ct. 
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prohibited a wide range of conduct. For example, the Oregon 
coercion116 statute criminalized threats to take a broad array of actions 
in order to compel another to engage in or refrain from engaging in 
certain conduct. l17 None of the statutes conditioned criminality on a 
finding of intent.lIs The courts found that a broad spectrum of 
behaviors would be unconstitutionally prohibited under the statutes. 
For example, the statutes facially prohibited a mother from informing 
her former husband that if he did not pay child support, she would 
report him to the court;lI9 prohibited a union from threatening to take 
collective action if its members did not receive higher wages;120 
prohibited a prosecutor from offering a plea bargain in certain 
circumstances;121 and criminalized speech commonly acceptable in 
journalism, law enforcement, and academia.122 
Although each state suggested that the courts engraft an intent 
App. 1993); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Or. 1982). 
116. Some states criminalize blackmail through more modern statutes referring to 
intimidation or coercion. See Lindgren, supra note 100, at 673 (defining the terms used in 
the regulation of extortionate behavior). 
117. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275 (1999) provides: 
(1) A person commits the crime of coercion when the person compels or induces another 
person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to abstain, or to 
abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to engage, by 
means of instilling in him a fear that, if the other person refrains from the conduct 
compelled or induced or engages in conduct contrary to the compUlsion or inducement the 
actor or another will: 
a. Unlawfully cause physical injury to the other person; or 
b. Unlawfully cause damage to property; or 
c. Unlawfully engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or 
d. Falsely accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against 
the person; or ' 
e. Cause 'or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person's 
business, except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the act or omission 
compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or 
f. Testify falsely or provide false information or withhold testimony or information with 
respect to another's legal claim or defense; or 
g. Unlawfully use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within 
or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such 
manner as to affect some person adversely. 
(2) Coercion is a Class C felony. 
118. Weinstein, 898 P.2d at 515; Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248; Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1120; 
Robertson, 649 P.2d at 578. 
119. Weinstein, 898 P.2d at 515. 
120. Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248, 1251. 
121. Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1120. 
122. Robertson, 649 P.2d at 589. 
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requirement to save the statutes from constitutional infirmity, each 
court found that a wrongful intent element would not rectify the 
constitutional overbreadth. 123 According to the Supreme Court of 
Colorado, "a specific intent requirement does not eliminate 
overbreadth concerns when the effect associated with the intent 
provision (in this case, to induce another to act against his or her will) 
encompasses a substantial amount of protected activity.,,124 
Does this mean that intent is also irrelevant to the 
constitutionality of a narrowly drawn blackmail statute? Not 
necessarily. Where the courts have denigrated the ameliorative 
constitutional effect of an intent requirement, the statute at issue has 
been vastly overbroad, facially criminalizing immense quantities of 
political and social speech. Narrowly tailored statutes, such as the 
federal and Florida laws, which include intent requirements and 
criminalize the threats of even lawful activities have successfully 
survived constitutional analysis. 
A domestic violence speech restriction would closely resemble 
the affirmed blackmail statutes. Like the federal, Florida, and 
Virginia statutes, the domestic violence speech restriction would 
sweep very narrowly, enjoining minimal speech. A domestic violence 
speech restriction, like the federal and Florida statutes, would 
proscribe what is ordinarily legal speech, but when coupled with 
malicious intent becomes unprotected speech. 
The domestic violence speech restriction suggested in Part I 
incorporates an explicit intent requirement. It specifies that the 
Respondent not divulge certain private information with the intent to 
harass or to cause emotional distress to the Petitioner.125 Such a 
requirement would assure that only maliciously motivated speech 
would be enjoined. A batterer's discussion of the victim's HIV status 
with his doctor, for example, would not be actionable because it 
would not be uttered with the intent to cause the victim emotional 
distress. 
An intent requirement, however, would present a challenge to 
enforcement. It would require that victims prove intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order to prevail in a contempt action against the 
batterer. Because most domestic violence victims enter the legal 
system unrepresented,126 this burden would be particularly onerous 
123. Weinstein, 898 P.2d at 517; Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248; Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1122. 
124. Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248. 
125. See supra Part 1. 
126. For example, approximately 70% of individuals petitioning for protection orders 
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and would significantly diminish the enforceability of the prohibition. 
However, such an intent requirement would not completely 
eviscerate the provision. The mere existence of a court order would 
deter the batterer from divulging the information. In fact, although 
courts may question the effectiveness ·of protection orders in 
eradicating abusive behavior, judges acknowledge their role in 
deterring abuse.127 Further, advocates or victims would be able to 
·make a strong case to prove intent in cases where the judge admits 
evidence of past threats to reveal the information. 
The state's interest in prohibiting extortionate speech is also 
relevant to First Amendment analysis of blackmail statutes. In 
Carricarte, the Florida Supreme Court suggested that the strength of 
the state's interest in protecting against blackmail confirmed the 
statute's constitutionality: "The state's interest in shielding its citizens 
from these types of strong-arm tactics can only be designated as 
compelling. To hold otherwise would transform the First 
Amendment into an instrument of leverage for the influential.,,128 
The same interest is at stake in the domestic violence context. 
Every individual, of course, is legally entitled to leave a romantic 
relationship. The victims outlined in the introduction, however, are 
subject to "strong arm tactics,,129 because their abusers happen to 
know personal information about them. Because of the potentially 
dire consequences resulting from the circulation of this information, 
the victim may choose not to exercise her legal right to leave the 
relationship. She will not have any protection from his threats if she 
does not concede to his will. Courts have an interest in intervening 
where the batterer has used unfair leverage and coercion to keep the 
victim in the battering relationship. In fact, the state's interest in 
protecting a victim in need of a domestic violence speech injunction is 
in the District of Columbia are unrepresented. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON 
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, at 143 (1992). 
127. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 43 (D.C. 1993) ("A [restraining 
order], of course, does not guarantee protection ... [r]ather its existence serves as a 
potential deterrent and provides a measure of peace of mind for those whose benefit it 
was issued."). Cf Ronald B. Adrine & Alexandria M. Ruden, Court Enforcement of Civil 
Protection Orders and Related Issues, in OHIO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW ch. 12 (2000) 
(stating that the threat of court enforcement of the protective order in the form of 
contempt provides a deterrent to future abuse). 
128. Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1980). See also City of Seattle v. 
Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (suggesting that there might be a 
compelling state interest in protecting citizens from extortionate threats). 
129. Carricarte, 384 So. 2d at 1263. 
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even greater than its interest in protecting the average victim of 
blackmail. Where the average blackmail victim must pay money to 
avoid injury to reputation, this victim is forced to sacrifice her bodily 
integrity. She must endure living with an individual who physically 
assaults her. To guard against the success of batterer's tactics, the 
court has no recourse other than to restrain this limited category of 
speech. 
Although the context of the speech at issue in a domestic 
violence speech restriction and its analogous nature to unprotected 
extortionate speech suggest that the speech may be accorded low 
value by the court, the analysis does not guarantee that the speech is 
unprotected. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the state interests 
to be protected by enjoining the speech. These interests must be 
weighed against the value of the speech to determine the viability of 
the injunction. 
IV. In the Balance: Interests at Stake 
When threatening to divulge private information about the 
victim, the batterer triggers several state interests. In cases where the 
victim has sought to retain the secrecy of this information for fear of 
employment or social repercussions, this dissemination is a severe 
assault to her privacy. The publication poses a separate threat to the 
victim's children. People might taunt or ostracize the children based 
on their parent's sexual orientation or HIV status. Moreover, the 
state has an interest in protecting individuals from domestic violence. 
That interest is profoundly implicated by a batterer's extortionate 
efforts to keep the victim in a violent relationship. Court doctrine 
regarding the propriety of speech restrictions in a family context is 
therefore relevant to the constitutional analysis. 
A. The state's interest in privacy 
In privacy suits, an individual may be liable for disclosing private 
facts to others130 in a way that would be highly offensive to a 
130. While many jurisdictions require publication to more than one person in order 
prevail in this suit, the dissemination of certain information by an abusive spouse to 
certain audiences may be actionable in certain jurisdictions. However, because restitution 
may be of little solace to a domestic violence victim who has just lost her job because her 
employer has discovered that she is HIV positive, ex post remedies are relatively useless to 
the class of victims at issue here. Ironically, as one commentator pointed out "though 
injury often flows from widespread publication of disclosed information, the greatest 
injury may well [sic] be caused by disclosure to a single person, such as an employer or a 
spouse." Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
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reasonable person. A disclosure of personal information invades two 
interests that the state seeks to protect through the common law: (1) 
An interest in the security of personal, confidential information about 
which the individual has an expectation of privacy; and (2) An 
interest in protecting the wronged individual from the repercussions 
of the circulation.l3l Although these actions impose liability for 
content-based disclosures, and although privacy-invading speech is 
not one of the exclusions from protection of the First Amendment, 
courts routinely impose liability when the protection of these interests 
outweigh the defendant's speech rights. 
Invasion of privacy suits pit two powerful American ideals 
against each other, requiring the courts to examine each alleged 
invasion on a case-by-case basis13~ to determine which interest trumps 
the other. \33 As the California Supreme Court explained: "the right to 
know and the right to have others not know are, simplistically 
considered, irreconcilable.,,134 However, privacy suits routinely force 
courts to reconcile these interests. 
Generally, as a value central to the American ideals of autonomy 
and self-definition, privacy is accorded significant respect by the 
judiciary. In a case challenging an invasion of privacy suit on First 
Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e note that 
privacy is not only a personal interest, butis also one of concern to 
society as a whole .. " In our view, fairly defined areas of privacy 
must have the protection of law if the quality of life is to continue to 
be reasonably acceptable.,,135 The D,C. Court of Appeals, in affirming 
the constitutionality of tort actions for invasion of privacy, held that 
1426,1435 (1982). See also discussion supra Part I. 
131. Vickery, supra note 130, at 1434-35 (identifying the interests at stake in a breach 
of professional confidence). 
132. The Court has thus far declined to announce a per se rule regarding privacy as it 
has in the case of defamation which would obviate the need for this grueling process. Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (declining to decide whether "the 
State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted pUblicity in the 
press."). See also Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 822 F.2d 747, 758 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The 
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether tort liability for truthful publication of private 
matters unrelated to public affairs is constitutionally permissible. "). 
133. This challenging reconciliation has spawned a great deal of scholarly commentary. 
See, e.g. Willard Pedrick, Publicity and Privacy: Is It Any of Our Business?, 20 U. TOR. 
L.J. 391 (1970) (analyzing privacy law and media free speech rights); Edward Bloustein, 
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and 
Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611 (1968) (wrestling to reconcile several 
theories of privacy with theories of freedom of speech). 
134. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971). 
135. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). 
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the action "represents a vindication of the right of private personality 
and emotional security, the essence of the interest protected being 
aptly summarized [ as] ... 'the right to be let alone. ",136 In fact, the 
D.C. Circuit held in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson that privacy is 
considered to be a compelling state interest, which can be so powerful 
that it might even overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality of 
prior restraints.137 
A court facing a First Amendment challenge to a privacy suit 
weighs privacy against the speech, assessing the value of the speech 
by reference to the public concern standard.138 Speech on matters of 
public concern holds an elevated status in the hierarchy of privacy-
invading speech.139 
The public concern standard protects the dissemination of 
information to which the public has a right of access. Salacious gossip 
falls outside the parameters of public concern. The Second 
Restatement of Torts articulates this standard as follows: 
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, 
account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the 
community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a 
matter of the community mores. The lines to be drawn when 
the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the 
public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying 
into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable 
member of the Rublic, with decent standards, would say that he 
has no concern. 40 
When courts balance speech against privacy, privacy most often 
prevails when the speaker is an individual not associated with the 
press.141 The involvement of the press transforms· the individual right 
136. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(citation omitted). 
137. 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
138. Gallela v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196,225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("It might be argued 
that the Court should not place itself in the position of drawing lines and of weighing the 
value of various communications so as to deny to some of them, under certain 
circumstances, the protection of the First Amendment. But that is what courts are for .... 
Not only is such an undertaking by the courts a familiar task, but it is essential to the 
reconciliation of these two basic rights - privacy and freedom of speech.") (citations 
omitted). 
139. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) ("[T]he Court has frequently 
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values' and is entitled to special protection.") (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982». 
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h. (1977). 
141. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1974) (holding that the 
First Amendment barred the imposition of civil liability on a television company for 
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to free speech into a community right of access to information.142 An 
invasion of. privacy by the media must reach an intolerable level 
before the courts will enjoin the publication.143 
Even the media's free speech rights, however, sometimes 
surrender to privacy in the context of an invasion of privacy suit. In 
Virgil v. Time, the Ninth Circuit suggested that a publishing house 
may be held liable for invasion of privacy.144 When researching an 
article on surfing, a journalist interviewed a body surfer who revealed 
not only his surfing escapades, but also some additional "rather 
bizarre incidents in his life that were not directly related to surfing.,,145 
After the interviews, but before publication, the surfer requested that 
the stories unrelated to surfing be redacted from the article.146 
Contrary to his request, the article, including all revelations, ran in 
Sports Illustrated.147 The surfer brought an invasion of privacy action. 
When the trial court denied the magazine's motion for summary 
judgment, the magazine appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Although it 
remanded the case, the Ninth Circuit determined that the article 
could have tortiously invaded the surfer's privacy.l48 As to the First 
Amendment concerns, the court found that the surfer's right to 
privacy could outweigh the value of the speech, defined by the 
public's right to know private facts about his life.149 "The public's 
right to know is... subject to reasonable limitations so far as 
concerns the private facts of its individual members.,,15o This case 
illustrates that even in the case of the media, freedom of speech can 
be defeated by an individual's interest in privacy - even after the 
individual has voluntarily shared the information with the defendant. 
The courts should assess an individual speaking about the private 
broadcasting the name of a rape victim); Afro-American Publishing Co., 366 F.2d at 649 
(holding that an invasion of privacy suit was barred by the First Amendment where a 
newspaper publisher circulated a photograph and article recounting plaintiff's comments 
that the newspaper was breeding interracial mistrust and tension). 
142. Afro-American Publishing Co., 366 F.2d at 654 (stating that in balancing privacy 
against freedom of the press "the courts are called upon ... to harmonize individual rights 
and community interests. "). 
143. State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1981). 
144. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975). 
145. [d. at 1124. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. at 1127. 
149. [d. at 1128. 
150. [d. 
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life of another with more leniency. Because such cases do not 
implicate freedom of the press, courts need consider only the value of 
the speech to the speaker. It is the individual speaker with whom we 
are most concerned for the purposes of analogizing to domestic 
violence speech restrictions. In two relevant cases, courts found that 
the right to privacy outweighed the speaker's right to freely 
disseminate the confidential details of another's life. In Doe v. Roe, a 
psychiatrist attempted to distribute a book that contained verbatim 
disclosures by a patient.l5l The patient confided these thoughts during 
therapy sessions.152 The court upheld the lower court's decision in 
favor of the plaintiff-patient, finding that the disclosure invaded the 
patient's right to privacy.153 Significantly, the court found that the 
plaintiff enjoyed a right to privacy that was "contractual and 
otherwise,,,154 clarifying that a protectible interest in privacy exists 
independently of any formal relationship between the parties. 
Another doctor was found liable of invasion of privacy in 
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's.155 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the 
judgment that the defendant doctor had invaded his patient's privacy 
when he published photographs of the patient before and after plastic 
surgery.156 The doctor distributed the photographs without the 
patient's consent to advertise his services.!57 The court's holding 
rested on the observation that the right to privacy "'stands on high 
grounds, cognate to the values and concerns protected by 
constitutional guarantees.",158 The court used the public concern 
standard to scrutinize the particular speech at issue to determine its 
value.159 When the court balanced the interest in privacy against the 
public's right to the information at issue, it found the plaintiff "had a 
higher interest to be protected."I60 
While some state courts have considered invasion of privacy suits 
by one individual against another, the Supreme Court has avoided 
151. Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1977). 
152. [d. 
153. [d. at 678. 
154. [d. 
155. 492 A.2d 580, 589 (D.C. 1985). 
156. [d. at 595. 
157. [d. at 584. 
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addressing the constitutionality of enjoining truthful statements by 
non-media actors about private individuals.161 The Court, however, 
has stated in dicta that lesser First Amendment concerns are raised 
when statements regard private individuals and are unrelated to 
bl· 162 pu IC concerns. 
How is this analysis relevant to the constitutionality of a 
domestic violence speech restriction? If a court identified the victim's 
privacy as the interest at stake, the court's analysis would be 
161. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) ("In ... Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, [we] expressly saved the question whether truthful publication of very private 
matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally proscribed.") (citing Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383, n.7 (1967»; Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 822 F.2d 747, 
758 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether tort liability for 
truthful publication of private matters unrelated to public affairs is constitutionally 
permissible."). But cf Vickery, supra note 130, at 1436 (arguing no cause of action for 
invasion of privacy should arise where private individuals speak about matters of private 
concern to friends or family because an individual should be able to operate within a zone 
of privacy without governmental interference). 
162. This dicta appears in cases addressing the constitutionality of libel suits. While 
this Article focuses on judicial protection of privacy in the context of privacy torts, one can 
discern the Court's evaluation of the importance of privacy in the context of private 
citizens by reference to the development of libel laws. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
the relationship between libel and privacy law, stating that privacy suits "share[ ] ... the 
same underlying purpose invoked by the [Supreme] Court ... in upholding the state's 
interest in the law of libel .... " Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 n.8 (9th Cir. 
1975). As it evolved, libel doctrine became more and more protective of speech regarding 
public figures and increasingly protective of privacy and reputation when involving speech 
regarding private individuals. This development culminated in Dun & Bradstreet, where 
the Court ultimately held that to prevail in a defamation action, a private individual suing 
for libel, concerning issues of private concern, may prevail without proving malice. Dun & 
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). This standard is less 
protective of speech than the standard applicable to public figures suing for speech on 
matters of public concern. In that scenario, public figures must show malice in order to 
prevail in a libel suit. 
The Dun & Bradstreet Court found speech regarding private individuals and matters of 
private concern simply of less First Amendment value than other speech: "In libel actions 
brought by private persons we found the competing interests different. Largely because 
private persons have not voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury ... and 
because they generally lack effective opportunities for rebutting such statements, we 
found that the State possessed a 'strong and legitimate ... interest in compensating private 
individuals for injury to reputation.'" [d. at 756 (quoting Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 345, 348-49 (1974» (citation omitted). Such speech does not have constitutional 
dimensions because "[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; 
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the 
press." [d. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 
(Or. 1977». See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72 n. 8 (1964) (stating that 
different interests might be involved where purely private libels are concerned, as opposed 
to libel suits involving the media). 
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analytically identical to the deliberation by courts facing First 
Amendment defenses to invasion of privacy suits.163 Courts would 
assess the constitutionality by weighing the individual's interest in 
privacy against the value of the speech. The public concern principle 
elucidates the value of the speech. As illustrated by the review of 
cases above, the nature of the information at stake can significantly 
affect the assessment of the speech's constitutional value. Therefore, 
the constitutionality of injunctions protecting HIV status, sexual 
orientation, and immigration status may differ and will be discussed 
in turn. 
Turning first to injunctions protecting the confidentiality of HIV-
related information, one finds significant precedent in privacy 
jurisprudence as guidance. The privacy interest in HIV-related 
information appears strong. In Yoder v. Ingersoll-Rand, the Sixth 
Circuit upheld a judgment for a plaintiff suing his employer under an 
invasion of privacy theory for disclosing his. HIV status. l64 The court 
held that the plaintiff had "no trouble establishing that his AIDS 
status is clearly a private fact, the disclosure of which would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.,,165 Further, many courts have held 
that the constitutional right to privacy covers HIV-related 
information.l66 The Second Circuit explained that the: 
163. Significantly, the Third Circuit held that a threat to disclose private information is 
as much an affront to privacy as the disclosure itself. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 
232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000). This conclusion enabled the court to find the threat 
actionable as an invasion of privacy. Id. This holding, again, is not significant in that it 
might make actionable the batterer's threats. Instead, its significance rests on the court's 
assessment of the importance of an individual's right to privacy. If an inchoate invasion of 
privacy is actionable, then the court has found the damage potential wrought by the 
disclosure to be substantial. In essence, the court permitted the imposition of liability for 
future speech. . 
164. Yoder v. Ingersoll-Rand, No. 97-3710, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31993 (6th Cir. Dec. 
22, 1998). . 
165. Id. at *6. 
166. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
"[i]ndividuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to 
privacy regarding their condition"); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(assuming a constitutionally protected privacy right related to HIV status); Doe v. Town 
of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Ma. 1993) (holding that constitutional right to 
privacy encompasses HIV status); Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(stating the high degree of privacy protection that should be accorded to HIV information 
contained in a presentence report); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. 
Ohio 1991) (individual has constitutional right to privacy related to HIV status when 
arrested); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715,731 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (inmates have 
a constitutional right to privacy covering unwarranted disclosure); Doe v. Borough of 
Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.]. 1990) (wife has a constitutional privacy right in 
husband's HIV status such that it is protected against governmental disclosure by a police 
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[e ]xtension of the right to confidentiality to personal medical 
information recognizes there are few matters that are quite so 
personal as the status of one's health, and few matters the 
dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater 
control over. Clearly, an individual's choice· to inform others 
that she has contracted what is at this point invariably and sadly 
a fatal, incurable disease is one that she should normally be 
allowed to make for herself. . .. An individual revealing that 
she is HIV seropositive potentially exposes herself not to 
understanding or compassion but to discrimination and 
intolerance .... 167 . 
39 
On the other hand, one could imagine that, under certain 
circumstances, courts could deem HIV status to be of legitimate 
public interest.l68 For example, if the batterer threatened to reveal the 
victim's HIV status to her employer where the victim is a health care 
provider who does not employ universal precautions, the information 
could prevent transmission. A court might even deem HIV-related 
speech to have a political dimension because issues of funding for 
AIDS research and discrimination against HIV positive individuals 
play a role in public policy discussions. Exaggerated fear of HIV 
transmission might render the injunction invalid in even the most 
clear cut cases. The caselaw, however, indicates a strong judicial 
preference for 'protecting the privacy of HIV-related information in 
the absence of strong countervailing interests. 
The legitimacy of the public's interest in sexual orientation is 
even less significant. In general, the law characterizes sexual 
orientation as a private matter not properly part of public dialogue 
absent the subject's consent.169 The Third Circuit recently considered 
officer). Cf Courts have further acknowledged the intimate and personal nature of HIV 
information that is "fraught with serious implications for that individual." Doe v. 
Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (acknowledging that family may 
ostracize the individual with AIDS and that discrimination may accompany publication of 
HIV status); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. SUpp. at 384 & n.8 (stating that 
disclosure may be accompanied by excessive harassment). 
167. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267. 
168. A judge's assessment of the public's legitimate concern in HI V-related 
information would be greatly affected by her own understanding and perception of the 
disease. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (looking to 
scientific data to determine the legitimate risk of HIV infection by a teacher to his 
students). If she believed that infected individuals could responsibly safeguard against 
transmission without disclosure, she might elevate the victim's interest in privacy. If 
however, she feared transmission anarchy, then she very well might refuse to grant the 
injunction. See generally Kohn, supra note 16, at n.105 (providing examples of and 
commentary on fear of AIDS transmission). 
169. Cf Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a rape victim has a 
right to privacy that covers aspects of the rape that serve no penalogical interest); 
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whether the constitutional right to privacy protects sexual 
orientation.170 In Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, the court 
considered whether a police officer violated an individual's right to 
privacy by threatening to disclose the individual's sexual orientation 
to his family.l71 After reviewing the Supreme Court precedent on 
point, the court determined that the decedent-plaintiff's sexual 
orientation was "an intimate aspect of his personality entitled to 
privacy protection .... ,,172 In fact, the court concluded that "[ilt is 
difficult to imagine a more private matter than one's sexuality .... ,,173 
The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court cases of Whalen 
v. Roe174 and Roe v. Wade 175 for the broad proposition that the right to 
privacy extends to protect individual autonomy in private matters and 
an individual's interest in maintaining the secrecy of highly personal 
information.176 The court acknowledged the ambiguity of Supreme 
Court precedent regarding homosexuality by referring to Bowers v. 
Hardwick. 177 In Bowers, the Court rejected the claim that the 
Constitution establishes a "fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.,,178 The Sterling court, however, found that 
Bowers did not correlatively deny a right to privacy regarding sexual 
orientation. The court reasoned that Bowers permitted the regulation 
of conduct but did not "purport to punish homosexual status," which 
would have contradicted the Supreme Court's proscription on 
criminalizing status.179 
Eastwood v. Dept. of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
constitutional right to privacy is implicated by a forced disclosure regarding sexual 
matters); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the right 
to privacy covers sexual behavior); Greenwood v. Taft, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1995) (stating that a litigant might be able to prevail in a privacy suit against an 
employer for publicizing his sexual orientation). But see Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396 
(3d Cir. 1999) (stating that an individual's constitutional right to privacy over sexual 
behavior may be subordinate to the government's interest in disclosure in cases involving 
sexual predators). 
170. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000). 
171. The court held that the threat to disclose the information constituted actionable 
invasion of privacy. See supra note 163. 
172. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196. 
173. Id. 
174. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
175. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
176. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. 
177. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 194 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986». 
178. Id. at 191. 
179. Sterling at 195 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962». 
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Historically, allegations regarding sexual orientation have no 
First Amendment value. Public statements about another's sexual 
orientation have even been subject to government regulation as a 
crime. Allegations of sodomy, whether true or false, have been 
recognized as acts constituting robbery or extortion.180 Courts and 
legislatures determined that such allegations deprived the target of 
the gossip of his reputation in the community.181 Sodomy was 
considered such a grave accusation, that simply threatening to allege 
it could have coercive consequences. As a Maryland court explained: 
If a man threatens to accuse another of an unnatural crime, 
sodomy, and thereby obtains property from him, the law 
regards it as robbery, because this offense is so loathsome 
that the fear of loss of character from such a charge, however 
unfounded it may be, is sufficient to reasonably induce a man 
to give up his property.182 
While none of these statutes was challenged on First 
Amendment grounds, as recently as 1970 these laws were still on the 
books.183 Such statutes indicate that legislatures historically did not 
view either truthful or defamatory statements regarding sexual 
orientation as valuable speech. The commission of sodomy was not 
viewed as a matter of public concern that might weigh heavily in the 
balance against privacy.l84 
However, one could argue that a person's sexual orientation is a 
matter of public concern. One might argue that it is relevant to her 
professional competence in certain jobs.18s Litigants have asserted 
180. Thompson v. State, 85 N.W. 62, 64 (Neb. 1901) (citation omitted) ("'As to the fear 
of injury to the reputation' says Greenleaf, 'it has been repeatedly held that to obtain 
money by threatening to accuse the party of an unnatural crime, whether the 
consequences apprehended by the victim were a criminal prosecution, the loss of his place, 
or the loss of his character and position in society, is robbery."'). 
181. MO. REV. STAT. § 560.130 (repealed); State v. Patterson, 196 S.W. 3 (Mo. 1917) 
("An indictment for robbery by extortion under [] 560.130, alleging the defendant 
threatened to accuse a third person of the crime of sodomy, which was named, but not 
defined ... was sufficient as a naming of the offense which [the] accused threatened to 
charge."). . 
182. Giles v. State, 261 A.2d 806, 808 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (quoting CLARK & 
MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 12.14, at 791 (6th ed. 1958». 
183. Id. (enforcing law criminalizing the accusations of sodomy). 
184. But cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the act of sodomy is 
not entitled to constitutional protection). 
185. See, e.g., Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (setting forth the Boy Scout's 
argument that a gay scout leader may have his scoutmaster position revoked because 
homosexuality is inconsistent with Boy Scout values); Nat'! Gay Task Force v. Bd. of 
Educ., No. CIV-80-1174-E, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17588, at *26 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 
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that information regarding sexual orientation is relevant to health and 
safety because it correlates to HIV status.186 Some might argue that 
sexual orientation has a political dimension that would transform 
gossip into political speech.18? 
An individual who has widely publicized her sexual orientation 
may also find it more difficult to argue that her status is not a matter 
of public concern. In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing, the court 
confronted a case in which a gay man blocked an assassination 
attempt on President Ford. A subsequent newspaper article lauded 
the man for his heroism and mentioned his sexual orientation. The 
article also suggested a correlation between the individual's sexual 
orientation and the absence of an official gesture of gratitude from 
the White House. The individual sued for invasion of privacy. A 
California court held his sexual orientation was not a private fact that 
could be the subject of an invasion of privacy suit because the plaintiff 
had widely publicized his status before the publication of the article. 
Further, the court found that the information was published with the 
intent to serve a political purpose, which further insulated the 
defendant from liability.188 The court held that: 
the record shows that the publications were not motivated by a 
morbid and sensational prying into [plaintiff's] private life but 
rather were prompted by legitimate political considerations, i.e., 
to dispel the false public opinion that gays were timid, weak and 
unheroic figures and to raise the equally important political 
question whether the President of the United States entertained 
1982) (holding that public homosexual activity would affect a teacher's performance and 
stating that "[o]bviously, the legislature has perceived that public homosexual conduct by 
a teacher might render him unfit to teach. This is not a totally irrational perception or a 
clearly erroneous idea."); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (acknowledging 
that an employee's homosexual conduct might affect his efficiency); Holmes v. Cal. Army 
Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing court decisions holding that 
homosexuality legitimately interferes with military efficiency). But cf Glover v. 
Williamsburg Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998) 
(holding that homosexual individuals are entitled to at least the same constitutional 
protection as any other identifiable group). 
186. See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) 
("Public health or like public concerns may justify access to information an individual may 
desire to remain confidential. In examining right to privacy claims, we, therefore, balance 
a possible and responsible government interest in disclosure against the individual's 
privacy interest.") (citations omitted); Poffv. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1987) (considering whether a landlord may refuse to rent an apartment to gay men on the 
grounds that they may become infected with HIV). 
187. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (1984) 
(holding that sexual orientation implicates political issues in certain circumstances). 
188. [d. 
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a discriminatory attitude or bias against a minority group such 
as homosexuals.189 
43 
Because the journalist had a legitimate purpose for discussing the 
plaintiff's sexual orientation, the First Amendment protected the 
information. 
But in the vast majority of cases arising in the context of a 
domestic violence speech restriction, the victim's sexual orientation 
would not properly be a matter of public concern.l90 In most cases, 
information about the victim's sexual orientation will simply be a 
weapon used by the batterer to exert power and control over the 
victim.191 If, as Sipple indicated, the intent of the individual 
publicizing the information is not relevant to the public concern 
inquiry, then the victim's sexual orientation should be an important 
protected privacy interest. The timing of the batterer's publication of 
the information would suggest that the batterer's intent does not have 
a political or public health dimension. If the batterer intended to 
disseminate the information in order to serve political or public 
health goals, then he would share the information regardless of the 
victim's willingness to stay in the relationship. However, because he 
threatened to divulge the information only as retribution for her non-
compliance with his wishes, his intent would seem clearly nefarious 
and void of political or health goals. 
Finally, we turn to the privacy interest in immigration status. 
While there are few invasion of privacy cases related to immigration 
status,l92 public policy suggests that it might form the basis for a 
compelling privacy interest. Although an illegal act ordinarily would 
be of legitimate public concern, Congress has suggested that in the 
context of domestic violence and immigration, information about 
189. Id. at 1049. 
190. This discussion raises the issue of whether characterizing homosexuality as a 
private matter is normatively advisable. While some gay individuals would prefer to be 
entitled to exert control over access to the information, others might find deeming the 
matter private to be stigmatizing. Declaring that an individual's sexual orientation should 
not be discussed without the permission of the individual suggests the matter is actually 
shameful. For an interesting discussion of sexual orientation and the public/private 
distinction, see David A. J. Richards, The Privatization of Our Public Discourse: Public 
and Private in the Discourse of the First Amendment, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L.& LIT. 61, 89-
95 (2000). 
191. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
192. See, e.g., Cardona v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 
93 C3912, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1853, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1995) (alluding to a 
possible privacy interest in immigration status); Crespin v. Kizer, 226 Cal. App. 3d 498, 523 
n.26 (1990) (assuming without deciding that immigration status is protected by the 
constitutional right to privacy). 
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immigration status obtained from a battering spouse is of little public 
value. In 1994, through the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 
Congress amended certain sections of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101, et seq. to address the specific 
quandary for battered women petitioning for immigration through 
their abusive spouses. Under the VA W A amendments, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was prohibited from 
making an adverse judgment on a petition for a battered woman 
based solely on evidence supplied by a spouse who battered the 
petitioner.193 Additionally, the battering spouse is under no 
affirmative obligation to report information concerning the petitioner 
to the INS.194 Finally, Congress further expanded protection for 
battered immigrant women when it passed the Violence Against 
Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 (VAWA 2000). Through 
VA W A 2000, Congress provided expanded options to attain 
immigration status to battered immigrant women who are not the 
spouses of citizens or lawful permanent residents. 195 
Congress specifically considered the plight of a battered woman 
whose abuser used threats of interfering with her immigration process 
as a means of trapping the woman in an abusive relationship. 
Title V [of the Battered Immigrant Women's Protection Act of 
2000] continues the work of the Violence Against Women Act 
of 1994 in removing obstacles inadvertently interposed by our 
immigration laws that may hinder or prevent battered 
immigrants from fleeing domestic violence safely and 
prosecuting their abusers by allowing an abusive citizen or 
lawful permanent resident to blackmail the abused spouse 
throu9h threats related to the abused spouse's immigration status. 96 
These congressional actions suggest that the legislature, at least, 
has determined that the batterer's information regarding the victim's 
immigration status is of little value to the INS. First, his reports are 
not required and may not even be the basis for INS decisions. 
Further, Congress has expressed an intent to provide special 
assistance to immigrant victims of domestic violence. The statute 
indicates that her status as a battered woman is of more interest to the 
INS than any information about her immigration status that the 
batterer could provide. In the face of these legislative 
193. 8 U.S.c. § 1367(a)(1)(A) (2001). 
194. See generally 8 U.S.c. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1186a(c) (2001). 
195. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513 (2000). 
196. 146 CONGo REC. S1OI88-03 (2000). 
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pronouncements that reveal that immigration status is not a matter of 
great public concern, a court might allocate very little weight to the 
batterer's interest in communicating the information and great weight 
to the immigrant-victim's privacy interest in controlling the 
information. 
B. The state's interest in protection of the family 
When a victim of domestic violence requests an lllJunction 
restricting the batterer from divulging personal information about 
her, her privacy is not the only interest at stake. In issuing an 
injunction, a. court might also consider the state's interest in 
protecting the victim from continuing domestic violence and 
safeguarding any children involved from the detrimental effects of the 
speech. Courts routinely act to protect these interests in the context 
of family law. Less frequently, but illustratively, courts weigh these 
interests against free expression in the context of injunctions on 
speech. This section focuses on the general strength of the state's 
interest in the well being of children and in protection from domestic 
violence, analyzing the specific treatment of speech balanced against 
these interests. 
As the paramount factor in child custody cases and divorce 
cases,197 courts consider the best interests of the child. 198 Physical and 
legal custody, visitation schedules, and parenting conditions depend 
on the needs of the children as perceived by the court. The parents' 
own needs are secondary to the child's. This interest in children's 
health and well-being can even override a parent's significant 
conflicting liberty interest. 
Acting to protect the welfare of children, a New Jersey court 
ordered a husband to relinquish his property rights to his marital 
residence even in the absence of any proof of physical or emotional 
injury to the children.199 After a divorce action vested property rights 
of the marital home in both the mother and father, the father-
defendant left the marital home voluntarily. Seventeen months later 
he returned without warning and commandeered the master 
bedroom. The court found that although the plaintiff presented no 
evidence of actual trauma to the children, the defendant-father's 
197. See In re Olson, 850 P.2d 527, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the welfare 
of the children is the State's central concern in marriage dissolutions). 
198. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(3) (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(a) 
(2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(1) (2000). 
199. Degenaars v. Degenaars, 452 A.2d 222 (1982). 
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presence compromised the welfare of the children. "[I]t would be 
inimical to the best interests and welfare of the plaintiff and the 
children to permit their lives, both emotionally and physically, to be 
traumatically invaded by the defendant's unilateral decision to 
resume residency in the marital home. ,,200 
In another case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed an 
injunction that significantly intruded upon freedom of association.201 
In Henley v. Rockett, the court affirmed an injunction prohibiting a 
woman from associating with her extramarital partner in any way.202 
The court found that the woman had alienated the affections of her 
paramour. Because the adulterous relationship compromised the 
"sacredness of the family relation," provided a negative example for 
the children, and reflected badly upon the children, the court found 
that the injunction appropriately restricted the woman's freedoms.203 
Protection from abuse, another interest at stake in the family law 
context, provides the basis for the constitutionality of domestic 
violence restraining orders that constrain certain liberties.204 The 
Supreme Court of South Dakota unambiguously stated that "without 
a doubt, domestic abuse protection orders preserve compelling 
governmental interests. ,,205 Another court questioned whether a First 
Amendment challenge to a domestic violence order could ever 
prevail, given the strength of the state's interest in protecting citizens 
from domestic abuse.206 
Several courts have confronted the direct conflict between the 
interest in child welfare and protection from domestic violence on 
one hand and free speech on the other. In State v. Hauge, the South 
200. Jd. 
201. See also Stark v. Hamilton, 99 S.E. 861 (Ga. 1919) (affirming an injunction 
prohibiting a man from talking to or coming near a woman he had "debauched ... and 
induced ... to abandon her parental abode and live with him in a state of adultery and 
fornication" in order to protect the child from harm). 
202. Henley v. Rockett, 8 So. 2d 852,855 (Ala. 1942). 
203. Jd. 
204. See Schramek v. Schramek, 429 N.W.2d 501 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a 
restraining order's no contact provision does not infringe on free speech because it is 
directed not at speech but at the suppression of physical abuse). See generally, Klein & 
Orloff, supra note 28, at 905-10 (reviewing decisions related to the constitutionality of 
restraining orders). 
205. State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173 (S.D. 1996). 
206. Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ("We ... first reject 
any notion that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution ... ever covered 
threatening or abusive communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for 
protection from an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse."). 
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Dakota Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a content-
neutral protection order enjoining the respondent from sending 
letters to the petitioner. After balancing the "compelling 
governmental interest[]" in stopping domestic abuse against the 
respondent's right to free expression, the court affirmed the order. 
"In the midst of domestic strife, preserving the mental and emotional 
health of the vulnerable must overcome other less compelling 
interests.,,207 Although the speech restriction regulated speech in a 
content-neutral fashion,208 the court took pains to characterize the 
state's interest as compelling, suggesting that even a content-based 
injunction might survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Cases involving content-based restrictions· in the family law 
context often seem ludicrous in both their specificity and in the extent 
of their intrusion into personal lives. These cases, however, suggest 
how a court might respond to a domestic violence speech restriction 
enjoining the dissemination of HIV, immigration, or sexual 
orientation information to third parties. In a particularly odd case, 
the Florida Supreme Court ordered a mother, as part of a divorce 
agreement, to do all that was in her power to convince her children 
that she wished the children to see and love their father.209 Against a 
First Amendment challenge, the court upheld the divorce provision 
because the state's interest in the welfare of children outweighed the 
burden on her speech. The court stated that: 
[t]here is no question that the state's interests in restoring a 
meaningful relationship between the parties' children and their 
father, thereby promoting the best interests of the children, is at 
the very least substantial. Likewise, any restriction placed on 
the mother's freedom of expression is essential to the 
furtherance of the state's interests because affirmative measures 
taken by the mother to encourage meaningful interaction 
between the children and their father would be for naught if she 
were allowed to contradict those measures by word or deed.210 
While the interest in protection of children and protection from 
violence is strong, some courts also have found speech restrictions 
targeted at restraining speech to third parties to be constitutionally 
infirm. One court partially invalidated an injunction prohibiting an 
207. Id. at 176. 
208. See In re Higbee, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 1416, c7-97-1588 (Dec. 30, 1997) for 
another case affirming the constitutionality of a content -neutral speech restriction 
contained in a domestic violence restraining order. 
209. Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991). 
210. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1293. 
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individual from making disparaging remarks about his wife to their 
children.211 To the extent the disparaging remarks were defamatory, 
the court found no constitutional infirmity with the injunction. 
However, noting that the state had a strong interest in fostering 
positive relationships between parents and their children, the court 
limited the injunction to cover defamatory statements, maintaining 
that content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid and found 
no justification for rebutting the presumption.212 
In a case involving a speech restriction resembling the speech 
restriction analyzed in this Article, a court invalidated a provision 
enjoining a party from disseminating information to third parties 
about her former husband's new wife.213 The court acknowledged, in 
In re Candiotti, the harm to the children posed by the malicious gossip 
at issue. However, the court found that under the California 
Constitution, the injunction suffered from overbreadth because it 
prevented the woman from talking privately to everyone about the 
topic. Further, the court found that such speech was "too attenuated 
from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior 
restraint .... ,,214 Although the court stressed that the California 
Constitution is more protective of speech than the U.S. 
Constitution,215 this case may well reflect the reaction of some courts 
to similar challenges under the U.S. Constitution. 
A woman needing the protection of a domestic violence speech 
restriction enjoining the dissemination of HIV, sexual orientation, or 
immigration information would be acting to enable herself and any 
children to escape an abusive relationship, to insulate herself from 
any negative repercussions from the publication of the information, 
and to safeguard her children from derivative injury from the 
dissemination. As revealed above, courts characterize these interests 
as strong, if not very compelling. A speech restriction prohibiting 
dissemination to specific audiences would not suffer from the fatal 
overbreadth of the injunction struck in In re Candiotti. Under such 
an injunction, the court would leave the batterer with countless 
211. In re Olson, 850 P.2d at 532. 
212. Id. 
213. In re Candiotti, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 303. (Under the California Constitution, "Every person may freely speak, 
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
this right .... " (emphasis added). The court explicitly stated that "this provision is more 
definitive and inclusive that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."). 
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alternative audiences for his speech. For example, the batterer would 
be entitled to speak ad nauseum to his friends, family, and health 
professionals about the victim's HIV status. The restriction would 
constrain his speech only in relation to the specific audiences that the 
victim fears will react adversely to the information. 
The state's strong established interests in promoting the welfare 
of children and protecting victims of domestic violence confirm that 
under certain circumstances the batterer's speech rights would be 
overcome in a constitutional analysis. 
V. A Domestic Violence Speech Restriction Does Not Present 
an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint on Speech 
At the time a court issues a domestic violence speech restriction, 
the batterer has merely threatened to speak the privacy-invading 
words; the actual utterance of the words is still inchoate. Restraints 
on future speech bear a presumption of invalidity,216 because they 
stifle speech before it has aired and undergone an adequate analysis 
of its constitutional value.217 Moreover, prior restraints risk gagging 
unanticipated audiences and suppressing unintended speech. 
While the prohibition on prior restraints of future speech is 
strong, it is not a conclusive hurdle.218 The Supreme Court has 
emphasized that not all injunctions on future speech are 
impermissible and that the rule against prior restraints should not 
serve as "a talismanic test.,,219 For example, in Kingsley Books v. 
Brown, Justice Frankfurter advocated a flexible, "pragmatic," 
individualized approach to prior restraint analysis.220 
The typical invalid prior restraint on speech enjoins the press 
from publishing newsworthy information.221 This type of restriction 
triggers the constitutional drafters' original concerns about 
216. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372u'S. 58, 70 (1963). 
217. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human ReI. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). 
218. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1212 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1978) (Spreecher, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]his label is merely an aid to categorization of First Amendment 
restraints ... the cry of prior restraint is a classic example of the tyranny of words which 
often accompanies the uncritical employment of a once-useful phrase."). 
219. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957). 
220. [d. at 442. 
221. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating a court 
order restraining the press from publishing or broadcasting defendant's admissions and 
facts implicating defendant during criminal trial); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971) (striking a court order enjoining newspapers from publishing a classified 
historical study on Viet Nam policy, the "Pentagon Papers"). 
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government suppression of the press.222 Judicial analysis of prior 
restraints issued against non-media actors is somewhat more lax. 
Courts often permit restraints on the future speech of private parties 
when there has been a prior adjudication of the constitutional value 
of the speech.223 Courts have held that if past conduct has already 
been adjudicated illegal,224 tortious,225 or otherwise lacking in 
constitutional protection,226 then future conduct constitutionally may 
222. N. Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717 ("Both the history and language of the First 
Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever 
the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 716 (1930) (referring to the historical importance of freedom of the press from 
prior restraints on speech). 
223. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (stating that a 
prior restraint may avoid constitutional infirmity by bearing the indicia of certain 
procedural safeguards including a judicial determination). 
224. When a statutory provision has been violated, case law is replete with decisions 
affirming the issuance of injunctions prohibiting future speech contravening the provision. 
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
390 (1973) (upholding an injunction against newspaper which violated municipal sex 
discrimination ordinance which prohibited newspaper from publishing advertisements in a 
discriminatory format because order would not go into effect before final determination 
that speech was not constitutionally protected). 
225. Courts will routinely uphold injunctions against speech constituting defamation 
and libel. See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding an 
injunction to prohibit defendant from repeating libelous and defamatory statements); 
Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) ("We 
therefore hold that the injunction below, limited as it is to material found either libelous or 
disparaging after a full jury trial, is not unconstitutional and may stand."); O'Brien v. 
Univ. Cmty. Tenants, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975) ("Once speech has judicially been 
found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for 
restraint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper.") (italics in 
original); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62-63 (Ga. 1975) (affirming an 
injunction prohibiting future libelous speech because there had been a jury verdict finding 
similar speech defamatory prior to the issuance of the injunction). 
226. See, e.g., San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 
1230 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming injunction against union prohibiting continuing display of 
signs near hospital entrance reading "This Medical Facility is Full of Rats" after a full 
hearing to determine the language was fraudulent and therefore unprotected). Another 
such injunction on future speech appears in the context of a bankruptcy dispute. In a 
Massachusetts case, a company submitted a bankruptcy plan to the court and received 
approval. The plan included a provision enjoining a director from entering the company 
premises or communicating with employees about company operations. The director 
appealed from the bankruptcy court to district court alleging that the injunction presented 
an unconstitutional prior restraint on his free speech. The court upheld the injunction, 
finding that while the director's behavior did not violate any specific statute or regulation, 
it interfered with the company's bankruptcy plan. At trial in bankruptcy court, the court 
issued the injunction "based upon a continuing course of repetitive conduct and granted 
after a final adjudication on the merits. To the extent that the speech of Haseotes 
constitutes conduct in violation of the [bankruptcy] Plan, it is not protected by the First 
Amendment." Haseotes v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 216 B.R. 690, 695 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
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be enjoined.227 "[O]nce a court has found a specific pattern of speech 
unlawful, an injunctive order prohibiting repetition, perpetuation, or 
continuation of that practice is not a prohibited 'prior restraint' on 
speech.,,228 Because a court has already judged the enjoined speech to 
be of low value before the order is issued, the restriction does not 
implicate the interests protected by the presumption against prior 
restraints. For example, after a full hearing on the matter, a court 
issuing an injunction would not be forced to speculate about the 
nature of the speech to be enjoined. Therefore, the injunction would 
not raise significant potential for suppression of protected speech. 
The injunction issues no abstract command that may reach an absent 
audience and have a pervasive chill on speech. 
While there is no steadfast rule regarding the procedural 
sufficiency of a prior adjudication, the caselaw reveals a consensus 
that a hearing on the merits adequately assesses the constitutionality 
of the speech.229 The litigant gets his day in court and the court enjoys 
the opportunity to analyze the speech. The clearest illustration of the 
constitutionality of prior restraints based on prior adjudication 
appears In cases involving statutory· violations and obscenity 
doctrine.23o 
1997). 
227. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The United States 
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that an injunction against speech generally will not be 
considered an unconstitutional prior restraint if it is issued after... [it] has [been] 
deterinined that the speech is not constitutionally protected."). 
228. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 858 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1138 (2000). 
229. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1957) (holding that an adversary 
hearing to determine whether material is obscene ensures that any subsequent injunction 
will not be a prior restraint); Haseotes, 216 B.R. at 695 (holding a full hearing before the 
bankruptcy court was sufficient to determine that the speech was part of a repetitive 
course of conduct and not meriting First Amendment protections). 
230. Another context in which courts routinely issue prior restraints on speech is 
litigation discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), courts may issue 
protective orders regarding discovery material whenever good cause is shown. FED. R. 
Ov. P. 26(c). Most states have adopted equivalent local rules permitting the issuance of 
protective orders. These orders, if temporary in nature, are uniformly found constitutional 
prior restraints on speech. Protective orders have been upheld against prior restraint 
challenges because they are limited in duration and scope. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 
467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that protective order did not offend First Amendment); 
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976). In Seattle Times, the 
Supreme Court distinguished protective orders from other restraints on future speech 
because the context of pretrial discovery is such that the information is limited to a very 
narrow scope and the protective order applies only to information learned in the context 
of discovery. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. Further, the Court found that because courts 
have substantial interest in the privacy and reputation of those involved in litigation, a 
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A. Statutory violations 
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. u.s., the 
Supreme Court considered an injunction issued against a trade 
association that violated the federal antitrust statute.231 The district 
court found that the trade association's code of ethics violated 
antitrust law by discouraging competitive bidding by its members.232 
The injunction restricted the association from issuing any opinion, 
policy statement, or guideline stating that competitive bidding is 
unethica1.233 The association argued that the injunction was an invalid 
prior restraint on speech because it enjoined future publication of 
codes of ethics.234 The Supreme Court, however, found the injunction 
to be valid and enforceable because the court had determined that 
the code of ethics had violated antitrust law. In fact, the injunction 
swept broadly and enjoined even more speech that a simple repetition 
of the same violation.235 The Court stated that, in order to remedy 
court can and often must act to protect those interests. Id. at 35. 
While restraining orders are similarly temporary in nature, the analysis of protective 
orders offers little insight to the issue at hand. The limited context in which protective 
orders are permitted suggests that an analogy is far-fetched. Courts have a special interest 
in protecting the privacy of information learned during discovery because the parties have 
submitted to the court's procedural rules. Further, protective orders restrain information 
only learned during discovery. See id. at 33 ("[R]estraints placed on discovered, but not 
yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of 
information."). This can be an extremely narrow scope of information. On the other 
hand, the information sought to be restrained in a domestic violence speech restriction has 
been shared prior to any court involvement and therefore is much more part of the public 
domain. The Seattle Times Court explicitly stressed the narrow applicability of protective 
order precedent in prior restraint doctrine: "In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability 
to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment 
rights of the restricted parties to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination 
of information in a different context." Id. at 34. 
231. Nat'l Ass'n of Profl Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
232. Id. 
233. Courts issuing injunctions under the Sherman Act are not the only actors entitled 
to issue broad restrictions because of past unlawful conduct, on what might otherwise be 
lawful speech. Congress authorized the issuance of prior restraints by the National Labor 
Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission. By statute, the two agencies are 
empowered to issue cease and desist orders to private parties who have violated labor and 
antitrust laws respectively. 29 U.S.c. § 160(c) (2001); 15 U.S.c. § 45(b) (2001). See also 
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Saja, No. CIV-97-0666-PHX-SMM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17225 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of an FTC cease and desist order). 
Often these cease and desist orders restrict speech by forbidding certain expression in 
violation of federal law. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-620 
(1969). 
234. Nat'l Ass'n of Profl Engineers, 435 U.S. at 679. 
235. Id. at 697. 
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antitrust violations, a court must sometimes impose injunctive relief 
that burdens constitutional rights: 
While the resulting order may curtail the exercise of liberties 
that the Society might otherwise enjoy,' that is a necessary 
and. .. unavoidable consequence of the violation .... In 
fashioning a remedy, the District Court may, of course, consider 
the fact that its injunction may impinge on rights that would 
otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protections 
do not prevent it from remedying the antitrust violations.236 
The Court reasoned that any threat to legitimate expression 
could be alleviated by the Society's petitioning the court for relief.237 
As discussed above in Aguilar v. A vis Rent a Car System, the 
California Supreme Court upheld an injunction prohibiting an Avis 
supervisor from using derogatory speech descriptive of Hispanic or 
Latino employees after the district court found that the supervisor's 
past conduct had violated the state anti-discrimination statute.238 The 
court held that this injunction against future speech was not an invalid 
prior restraint on speech. "Under well established law ... the 
injunction at issue is not an invalid prior restraint, because the order 
was issued only after the jury determined that defendants had 
engaged in employment discrimination, and the order simply 
precluded defendants from continuing their unlawful activity.,,239 
Arguably, like the speech restriction in National Association, the 
A vis injunction precludes even more speech than would be unlawful 
under the anti-discrimination statute. Using ethnic epithets 
descriptive of Hispanic workers may be perfectly lawful if it does not 
become pervasive or severe enough to alter working conditions.240 
The court, however, did not instruct the lower court to limit the scope 
of the injunction to unlawful speech. 
B. Prior adjudication finding speech unprotected 
Courts also issue permissible injunctions on future speech after 
an adjudication determining the speech lacked constitutional 
protection. Beginning in 1931 with Nearv. Minnesota, the Supreme 
Court has painstakingly noted that in the context of obscenity, 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1138 (2000). See also supra notes 
62-66 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of the A vis decision. 
239. Id. at 856-57. 
240. Id. at 850. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 54 2001-2002
54 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LA W QUARTERLY [Vol. 29: 
freedom of speech is not absolute, nor is the ban on prior restraints.241 
For example, to protect the public welfare, courts can enjoin the 
publication of obscene matter that may offend community decency.242 
The Supreme Court stated in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago that the 
"capacity for evil" associated with the speech is relevant to the 
permissible judicial remedy, intimating that under certain 
circumstances a restraint on future speech may be necessary.243 A 
total ban on prior restraints would incapacitate the states from best 
controlling their own social problems.244 
After Times Film, the Court stepped further into the arena of 
obscenity and prior restraints with Kingsley Books v. Brown and 
Freedman v. Maryland. In these cases, the Supreme Court stated that 
courts may enjoin future publication of matter adjudicated obscene at 
an adversary hearing.245 In Freedman v. Maryland the Supreme Court 
held that the statutory scheme requiring that filmmakers submit their 
movies to the Maryland censorship board for approval before 
distribution created an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech 
because the procedural safeguards were inadequate.246 Analyzing the 
statutory scheme devised by the legislation, the Court found that the 
exhibitor did not have an adequate opportunity to be heard on the 
propriety of censorship once the movie had been rejected. The 
censor's decision could not act as a final adjudication of protected 
expression.247 The Court stated that the best way to ensure that 
constitutionally protected speech would not be enjoined is an 
adversary proceeding: "The teaching of our cases is that, because only 
a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the 
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure 
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final 
restraint. ,,248 
When analyzing restraints on potential obscene publications, 
courts will permit a restraint where an adversary hearing has led to 
241. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716 (1931); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 
155 (1959) (observing that the states possess the power to "prevent the distribution of 
obscene matter"). 
242. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961). 
243. [d. 
244. /d. 
245. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965); Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 
436,441 (1957). 
246. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. 
247. [d. 
248. [d. 
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the determination that the speech is unprotected. After this 
determination, the state actor may consider the potential for harm 
presented by the speech and fashion a remedy that can best protect 
the public while minimally burdening speech. 
c. Application of the prior adjudication principle to a domestic 
violence speech restriction 
In the context of a domestic violence speech restriction, a court 
would have the opportunity to make a determination about the value 
of the speech prior to issuing the restraint. Protection order statutes 
would ensure that there would be a prior adjudication of the 
batterer's statutory violation. A victim requesting an order enjoining 
speech about her health, sexual orientation, or immigration status 
would be required to petition the court for such relief.249 The 
opposing party would be given an. opportunity for an adversary 
hearing.250 In most jurisdictions, a judge would issue a protection 
order only if she had found that the batterer had violated a criminal 
statute. Once the court established a statutory violation, the caselaw 
indicates that the court would be able to issue a broad restriction to 
avoid both a recurrence of that conduct as well as future speech that 
is part and parcel of that conduct. Just as in National Association and 
Avis, the batterer would have forfeited the right to speak in certain 
ways based on his past conduct. 
When the victim is before the court proving the abuse, she would 
also be able to present the facts necessary to make an assessment of 
the protected nature of the speech. In an ad'lersarial trial, the judge 
would determine whether the batterer has a protected right to speech 
divulging the victim's personal information. This procedural 
safeguard may adequately address prior restraint concerns raised by 
the domestic violence speech restriction.251 
If the court considered the "capacity for evil" presented by the 
privacy-invading speech,252 as it did in Times Film, then it might well 
conclude that a prior restraint is the most effective - potentially the 
249. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(a) (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(a) (2001); D.C. 
CODE ANN. 16-1005 (2001). 
250. Id. 
251. What remains unknown is the effect on the prior restraint analysis of a batterer's 
consent to a restraining order or a default judgment. If the speaker merely has an 
opportunity for an adversary hearing, but forfeits that right, maya court enter a restraint 
on his future speech merely in an ex parte analysis of the nature of the speech? Case law is 
silent on this question. 
252. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961). 
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only effective - means to protect the victim. The speech, by its very 
utterance, may decimate the victim's personal or professional life. 
The destruction may be irreparable. Given societal biases, HIV and 
sexual orientation status may have severe social and professional 
repercussions. In the case of immigration status, a federal actor might 
swiftly deport the victim. If the propriety of prior restraints depends 
even remotely on the expression's potential for destruction, then a 
court might find ample comfort in issuing a prospective restraint on 
the batterer's speech in a domestic violence situation. 
The Supreme Court stated in Nebraska Press that prior restraints 
should generally be avoided because they are final and irreversible, 
whereas criminal and civil remedies to speech are subject to appellate 
review and are therefore safer.253 However, this rationale does not 
apply to a situation where there has been an individualized hearing 
adjudicating a statutory violation and assessing the nature of the 
speech, and where the harm to be caused by the speech is 
unredressible by subsequent lawsuits. As discussed earlier, once this 
speech has been published, the victim may have been irreversibly 
damaged. This is the speech that Professor Lawrence Tribe refers to 
as unprotected speech "projectiles," which constitute no part of a 
dialogue.254 Criminal and civil remedies are useless to this victim. 
Moreover, appellate review is always available to a litigant in a 
domestic violence case who believes that his freedom of speech has 
been unconstitutionally restrained. 
The reasoning behind the constitutionality of prior restraints 
where the speech has been the subject of a prior adjudication is 
particularly appropriate in the context of injunctions. A judge may 
issue an injunction after she has heard the factual allegations 
substantiating the issuance of an injunction. She has the opportunity 
to narrowly tailor the injunction to the specific context and specific 
litigant, guarding against a generalized chill on speech or the 
unwitting gagging of absent parties.255 Further, the Supreme Court 
253. Neb. Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
254. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 837 (2d ed. 
1988). 
255. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 778 (1994) (Souter, J. 
dissenting) (stating that injunctions should be given more leeway when judged for 
constitutional infringement because the remedy is so narrowly tailored that it applies only 
to the litigant and not to society at large); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 
846,861 (Cal. 1999) (citing Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997)); Gallo v. Acuna, 929 
P.2d 596, 610-611 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied sub nom., Gonzalez v. Gallo, 521 U.S. 1121 
(1997) (emphasizing the salient differences between a statutory command and an 
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has held that trial courts should have some discretion in issuing 
injunctions once illegal conduct has been found, even in the realm of 
injunctions potentially touching on constitutional concerns, because 
"the district court has firsthand experience with the parties and is best 
qualified to deal with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day 
implementation of constitutional commands.,,256 
Because the court would have authority to issue the domestic 
violence injunction only if the injunction were proposed as part of a 
restraining order hearing, the court would have the chance to 
narrowly tailor the injunction to prohibit only the particular speech 
that had been threatened by the batterer. The court would also be 
able to craft the injunction to permit the batterer to speak about the 
topic to other audiences that do not pose a threat to the victim. For 
example, if the batterer wanted to talk to his own physician about the 
victim's HIV status, he would be able to do so. Therefore, the court 
would not be forced to speculate about potential breadth and reach of 
the injunction in inhibiting valid speech. 
Although a domestic violence speech restriction would carry a 
presumption of invalidity because it restrains future speech, the 
statutory scheme that permits its existence suggests that it should fall 
into· the class of restrictions that does not offend the First 
Amendment. 
VI. What Would a Constitutional Order Look Like? 
A domestic violence speech restriction's constitutionality will 
depend on the context of the battering relationship and the drafting 
of the order. First, the batterer must have committed abusive acts 
against the victim, thereby entitling her to protection under her state 
protection order statute. If she is not entitled to a protection order on 
the basis of the abuse, then the court has no authority to issue a 
speech restriction. The state statute must incorporate a catch-all 
relief provision, authorizing the court to implement any relief 
required to effectively end the abuse. Second, the circumstances of 
the abuse and coercion must render substantial the state's interest in 
protecting the victim's privacy, safety, or the welfare of any children 
involved. Without a strong state interest in issuing the injunction, this 
speech restriction will not be a valid infringement on the batterer's 
injunction that renders an injunction less constitutionally infirm). But see Madsen, 512 
U.S. at 764-65 (reasoning that because injunctions represent judicial fiat, they require 
more stringent application of First Amendment principles). 
256. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,184 (1987). 
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free speech rights. Third, the history of the batterer's abuse and 
manipulation will need to prove the low constitutional value of the 
speech. Because context is vital to the constitutional valuation of 
speech, the victim will need to present extensive evidence of the 
batterer's threat to reveal the information as a coercive tool to keep 
her in the relationship. Moreover, to illustrate the minimal value of 
the speech, the victim will need to establish that the dissemination 
would not significantly serve public welfare. For example, she will 
need to show that the audiences who the batterer would address if 
permitted are not endangered by their lack of access to the 
information at issue. 
The injunction itself will need to be carefully drafted. To satisfy 
constitutional dictates, the injunction will need to incorporate an 
explicit intent requirement. The intent requirement allows the 
injunction to fall squarely into the blackmail paradigm, suggesting the 
speech is of minimal constitutional value. Because the violation of 
the speech restriction will require a wrongful intent, the injunction 
will not prohibit the batterer from speaking in ways that are socially 
valuable and innocuous to the victim. 
In order to avoid invalidity as a prior restraint, the order will 
need to issue after an adjudication determining either that the 
batterer's conduct constituted a statutory violation, or that the speech 
was of low constitutional value. When a victim presents evidence of a 
criminal act in order to obtain the protection order, the court will be 
able to issue the speech restriction as relief necessary to remedy the 
effects of the past statutory violation. On the other hand, when a 
victim can and is required only to present evidence of abuse that may 
not constitute a statutory violation, the court will be able to grant a 
speech restriction only after a full adversarial hearing on the nature of 
the speech. 
Finally, any domestic violence speech restriction will need to be 
narrowly tailored, leaving the batterer extensive alternative avenues 
for speech. There will need to be an identifiable nexus between the 
enjoined speech and the state's protected interests. For example, the 
order must not prohibit the batterer from discussing his HIV status 
with a health care provider. Such a proscription would not 
substantially serve the state's interest in protecting the victim from 
abuse or from a breach of privacy. 
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Conclusion 
When an abusive partner realizes that the victim truly has made 
affirmative efforts to leave him, he may feel emasculated. His threats, 
protestations of love, and domestic terrorism have all proved futile in 
his efforts to retain control over her. It is at this time that many 
batterers turn to other devices to exert domination over the fleeing 
partner. It is at this time that the risk of serious violence in intimate 
relationships is at its hight.257 After the victim has made efforts to 
escape, the batterer is most likely to seek to retaliate against her by 
sabotaging the independent life she tries to establish for herself. One 
commentator dubbed this phenomenon "postseparation woman 
abuse," characterizing it by the batterer's desire to "gain, retain, or 
regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the 
relationship. ,,258 Victims consistently relay stories of the batterer's 
false reports to child protective services; false "anonymous" tip offs to 
employers about the victim's disloyalty or dishonesty; and calls to 
employers or family members revealing damaging, truthful personal 
information about the victim.259 While the batterer may have 
threatened to reveal this information in order to keep her in the 
relationship, once he receives court paper work confirming the 
victim's desire to end the relationship, he is likely to follow through 
on previously empty threats. A domestic violence speech injunction 
would deter the batterer from making this report and might give the 
victim the security she needs to leave the abusive relationship. 
While no court has adjudicated the constitutionality of such an 
injunction, it is clear that the prohibition on prior restraints and strict 
scrutiny analysis will pose significant challenges. However, analysis 
of First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that under certain 
circumstances such a restriction will withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Strict scrutiny analysis ensures that these restrictions will not 
have any significant corrosive effect on the Free Speech Clause. The 
257. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATIERED WOMEN KILL 4,61,144 (1987) (citing 
the high incidence of further abuse and homicide upon separation); Mahoney, supra note 
1, at 6 ("At the moment of separation or attempted separation ... the batterer's quest for 
control often becomes most acutely violent and potentially lethal. "). According to one 
study at least half of women who leave their abusers are followed, attacked or harassed by 
them. [d. at 64. Another study revealed that half of interspousal homicides occurred after 
the partners had separated. [d. 
258. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 65-66. 
259. These anecdotes are derived from my own practice representing victims of 
domestic violence in the District of Columbia over the past five years. 
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state's interests must substantially outweigh the value of the 
batterer's speech for this injunction to be constitutional. Further, the 
injunction must be narrowly tailored and alternative avenues for 
communication would need to be provided. While the nature of the 
speech might be similar, if these threats to divulge information were 
taking place between neighbors or co-workers the interests at issue 
would be far less compelling. In contrast, in the domestic violence 
context, the state's interests in the victim's privacy and the protection 
of family safety weigh heavily against the batterer's speech rights. 
Protection of these vital interests against destructive gossip suggests 
that it is normatively important and constitutionally sound to 
advocate for this type of injunction. 
